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The Effects of In-Group Bias and Decision Aids on Auditors’ Evidence Evaluation 
 
Eileen Zalkin Taylor 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This study examines the effect of in-group bias and decision aid use on auditor 
judgments, confidence, and decisions in an analytical procedures task. In-group bias, a 
product of Social Identity Theory, may impair auditor independence by influencing 
auditor judgments. Auditors rely on client representations to support their opinion of the 
financial statements; however, clients are sometimes former auditors of the external audit 
firm. This prior relationship could lead the auditor to exhibit unwarranted trust of client 
representations. In an online mixed design experiment using staff and senior auditors, I 
test whether auditor judgments, confidence in those judgments, and decisions to extend 
testing differ based on a client’s prior affiliation. I find that there is insufficient evidence 
of in-group bias in auditor judgments, confidence, or decisions. Lack of support could be 
due to the small sample size. In the same experiment, I give auditors access to a decision 
aid. Practice and prior literature suggest using decision aids should improve audit 
judgment. I find that a structured decision aid improves audit judgments and decisions for 
all auditors, and improves confidence for auditors who initially made good judgments. 
Audit managers can benefit from noting the usefulness of decision aids in improving 
judgment. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This study examines whether in-group bias, an inclination to trust one’s own 
group members, affects auditors’ judgments, confidence in those judgments, and 
decisions in an analytical procedures task. It also explores whether a decision aid 
successfully mitigates in-group bias and improves auditors’ decisions. Auditors perform 
analytical procedures in which they gather information from multiple sources to justify 
and explain changes in account balances; they often rely on client representations for 
supporting evidence (Biggs et al. 1995). When evaluating client representations, auditors 
must consider the client’s source reliability, which includes both competence and 
objectivity (Hirst 1994).1 In-group bias, which occurs when group members extend 
unjustified trust to other group members (Hewstone et al. 2002), could impact this 
evaluation.2  As companies hire members of their external audit firm to work in key 
financial positions, former auditors become clients, yet current auditors may still consider 
them group members. The resulting in-group bias could lead auditors to overrate a 
client’s objectivity, which would lead to an inappropriately high source reliability 
judgment. Auditors could conclude that evidence is sufficient when it is insufficient, 
prematurely end the search for additional or corroborating evidence, or exhibit an 
unjustified confidence in the final audit opinion. All of these outcomes could result in an 
ineffective audit. 
                                                 
1 Objectivity, in this context, simply refers to the client’s willingness to be truthful to the auditor. In other 
auditing literature, objectivity is also a measure of bias in an individual’s judgment. In this study, I am 
exploring the effect of a bias on the auditor’s judgment of the client’s objectivity. 
2 Biases in auditor judgments, specifically those related to the auditor’s evaluation of source reliability, 
have been the topic of several auditing studies (Anderson et al. 2003, Anderson et al. 1994, Bamber 1983, 
Hirst 1994).  
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Companies often hire employees from their external audit firm, (Beasley et al. 
2000; Bleed 2002; Lennox 2005). In several of the most recent audit failures, high-
ranking accounting personnel were also alumnae of the company’s external audit firm 
(Barrionuevo 2002). Congress has recognized the potential for in-group bias to influence 
auditor judgments and has restricted public companies from hiring their external auditors 
in positions of financial authority for a one-year period. 3 AICPA Ethics Interpretation 
101-2  cautions that client hiring of their external auditors might impair independence 
(AICPA 2005). The Independence Standards Board also warned that auditor 
independence could be threatened by their familiarity or prior longstanding relationships 
with attest client (Independence Standards Board 2000). While these bodies recognize in-
group bias as a threat, empirical studies of the phenomenon in auditing are scarce. King 
(2002) demonstrated in-group bias among auditors in a behavioral experiment. Lennox 
(2005) found that companies with affiliated executives (employees who were former 
members of the current external audit firm) were more likely to receive a clean opinion 
than companies without affiliated executives, and Menon and Williams (2004) found 
evidence of abnormal accruals in firms with affiliated executives. These studies suggest 
that auditors may exhibit in-group bias. 
Even though the above studies suggest in-group bias exists among auditors, there 
are some reasons why individual auditors may be immune to this bias. Auditors have 
strict professional standards, training in professional skepticism and independence, are 
                                                 
3 Sarbanes-Oxley mandates that the CEO, Controller, CFO, Chief Accounting Officer or person in an 
equivalent position cannot have been employed by the company's audit firm during the 1-year period 
preceding the audit (Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 2002).   
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subject to public accountability, and must meet stringent exam requirements. These 
factors suggest an auditor could accurately assess client objectivity, or lack thereof, 
regardless of past associations. Indeed, Bamber et al. (1995) notes several studies which 
suggest that auditors are less susceptible to psychological biases.  
Whether and to what extent auditors demonstrate in-group bias toward former 
audit team members is an empirical question. It is important to answer this question since 
this bias could threaten the auditor’s professional judgment, resulting in an unacceptably 
high risk of audit failure. Given the widespread practice of companies hiring their 
external auditors, and considering the recent Congressional laws, I first test the extent of 
in-group bias on auditor judgments and decisions. I then test whether a decision aid can 
improve audit judgments.  
Practitioners use decision aids to improve auditing (Bedard and Graham 2002). 
These aids support decision-making by overcoming human information processing 
limitations (Rose 2002), automating structured decisions (Abdolmohammadi 1991), and 
providing models and data to assist the auditor in choosing between alternatives in semi-
structured tasks (Abdolmohammadi 1991). I use analytical procedures in this study 
because they are semi-structured tasks: they have a reasonably well-defined problem, 
with limited alternatives, requiring some judgment (Abdolmohammadi and Usoff 2001; 
Abdolmohammadi 1991). I supply auditors with a decision aid that lists plausible 
explanations for a given account fluctuation. If in-group bias causes auditors to exhibit 
unjustified trust, which results in an incorrect audit judgment, a decision aid could 
provide the auditor with guidance regarding the correct judgment, thus mitigating the 
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negative effect of in-group bias. In practice, this decision aid could be something as 
simple as a listing of expected account relationships or something more complex, such as 
an interactive computer model that provides a probability report. A decision aid can also 
improve audit judgment in the absence of group bias by directing attention to relevant 
indicators. 
I use a mixed design experiment with one between-participants variable, group 
affiliation (in and out) and one within-participants variable, decision aid (pre and post). 
Senior and staff auditors evaluate a client-provided explanation for the results of an 
analytical procedure; the client is either a former audit team member or a longstanding 
client employee. Dependent variables, measured pre- and post-decision aid, include the 
auditor’s plausibility judgment, his confidence in that judgment, and his decision about 
how much to extend audit testing. After evaluating demographics (task experience, level, 
and affiliation) as possible covariates, I analyze the data using the appropriate statistical 
methods. 
  To summarize, first, I test for in-group bias in an audit context, exploring how this 
bias affects auditor judgment, confidence in that judgment, and decisions to extend audit 
testing. Second, I evaluate whether a decision aid is effective in improving audit 
judgments, confidence and decisions. Based on data collected, there is insufficient 
evidence to conclude that in-group bias exists among auditors performing an analytical 
procedure. Further, there is no indication that in-group bias affects either confidence or 
decisions to extend testing. Findings indicate that decision aid use improves auditor 
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judgments and auditor decisions for all auditors, but only improves confidence for 
auditors who initially provided a correct judgment.   
 One cannot conclude that insignificant findings indicate an absence of in-group 
bias. The small sample size and use of nonparametric tests reduce the likelihood of 
finding an effect, should one exist. Future research with a larger sample could yield 
results that are more conclusive. Audit firms should be especially interested in the 
findings related to the effectiveness of the decision aid in improving both judgments and 
decisions. The simple decision aid used for this task offers a feasible and cost-effective 
tool for practice improvement.  
 The dissertation continues as follows: Chapter 2 includes the literature review  
and development of the hypotheses, Chapter 3 describes the method, discusses the 
research design and provides results of the pilot test, Chapter 4 includes the statistical 
analysis, and Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of results, limitations, and future 
research.. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Introduction 
This section provides an overview of the audit and psychology literature 
pertaining to this study. The first part of this section focuses on a review of the audit 
literature related to analytical procedures and the auditor’s judgment process during those 
procedures. I use the Anderson and Koonce (1998) model, which is a two-step approach 
including plausibility and sufficiency checks. I then integrate source reliability literature 
from the audit field, focusing on the auditor’s judgment of client objectivity. I proceed to 
review the recent studies on auditor affiliation, discussing how affiliation can impact the 
audit process. I follow this discussion by a review of the seminal literature on social 
identity theory (Tajfel 1981), moving toward a definition of inter-group bias, and finally 
discussing how group biases can impact auditors. Hypotheses related to in-group bias are 
then stated. 
The second part of this section provides a discussion of the audit-related debiasing 
literature, followed by a review of how decision aids can be used to improve auditor 
judgment and decisions.  
2.2 Analytical Procedures and Source Reliability Judgments 
2.2.1 Analytical Procedures 
 Generally Accepted Auditing Standards require auditors to obtain sufficient, 
competent, evidential matter to reasonably support their opinion of a client’s financial 
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statement presentation and disclosures (AICPA 2005). AU Section 329 “Analytical 
Procedures” defines these procedures as “…evaluations of financial information made 
by a study of plausible relationships among both financial and nonfinancial data” 
(AICPA 2005, 465). This standard requires auditors to perform analytical procedures in 
both the planning and review stages of the audit (AICPA 2005). When used during 
planning, analytical procedures help auditors identify accounts that need further 
investigation, allowing them to budget more time and testing to these areas. AU Section 
329.09 also suggests that auditors use analytical procedures as a substantive test during 
fieldwork to obtain evidence about financial statement assertions (AICPA 2005). 
Analytical review procedures require auditors to develop expectations about account 
balances based on their knowledge of internal and external factors. These factors might 
relate to industry averages, current economic indicators, changes in accounting or 
operations policies, or firm-specific growth. After developing expectations, auditors 
compare their expectations to financial statement assertions, investigating differences. 
This investigation requires auditors to gather information from multiple sources. Auditors 
must also have a complete understanding of how accounts are related, in order to assess 
the reasonableness of account balance changes. 
 Practicing auditors commonly place great reliance on analytical procedures 
(Anderson et al. 1994; Biggs et al. 1995). Hirst and Koonce (1996) conducted a field 
study in which they interviewed 36 audit professionals (seniors, managers, and partners) 
about the use of analytical procedures in practice. They found that auditors use analytical 
procedures as a substantive test to determine account balance validity. Further, during 
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substantive testing, auditors emphasize “…the explanation development /evaluation and 
information search aspects…” of analytical procedures (Hirst and Koonce 1996, 476). 
The study also notes that although auditors report improvements in judgment over time 
(as they gain experience) they admit that even with additional experience their confidence 
in evaluating client explanations remains low. 
Auditors obtain explanations for unexpected fluctuations from multiple sources 
(Anderson et al. 2003). Changes in balances may relate to external events (e.g., a change 
in general economic indicators or competition), or may result from internal client 
decisions (e.g., discontinuation of a product line or replacement of depreciated assets). 
When changes result from external causes, auditors can probably gather evidence from 
objective external sources. However, when changes result from internal management 
decisions, auditors often rely on client explanations. In practice, Hirst and Koonce (1996) 
find that while experienced auditors are more likely to self-generate possible explanations 
before turning to the client, less experienced auditors are more likely to ask the client 
first. Both experienced and novice auditors turn to the client either to confirm or to seek 
explanations regarding the causes of observed fluctuations. The degree of reliance the 
auditor places on these explanations depends on his assessment of the client’s objectivity.  
2.2.2 The Judgment Process 
According to the Anderson and Koonce (1998) model in Figure 1, auditors 
proceed through a two stage process when evaluating evidence. Auditors start with a two-
step plausibility check. In the first step, they assess whether an explanation is consistent 
with the observed fluctuation. For example, if net income increases, an increase in sales 
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would be a plausible reason; an increase in common stock would not be a plausible 
reason. Once auditors judge a cause consistent with the fluctuation, they then consider 
whether the cause is consistent with the available information. Did sales, in fact, 
increase?  If the evidence shows that sales decreased, this explanation would not be 
consistent with the facts and auditors would judge this explanation implausible 
(Anderson and Koonce 1998). After compiling a list of plausible hypotheses, auditors 
perform the sufficiency evaluation task. This evaluation requires an assessment of how 
much of the variation in the account is explained by the explanation overall.  
Figure 1 
Model of the Evaluation of Causes in Analytical Procedures 
(Anderson and Koonce 1998, 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although prior research has found that auditors often fail to adequately assess 
sufficiency (Anderson et al. 2003; Anderson and Koonce 1998; Hirst and Koonce 1996), 
little research has examined auditors’ ability to assess plausibility. Since auditors 
Is cause consistent with unexpected 
fluctuation? 
Is cause consistent with the 
available information? 
Is cause of a sufficient magnitude to 
account for substantially all of the 
fluctuation? 
Plausibility Check 
Sufficiency Check 
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recognize basic accounting relationships, it is likely that they would accurately complete 
step one of the plausibility judgment (explanation is consistent with change in account 
balance). However, because step two of the plausibility check requires auditors to search 
for confirming evidence, they could fail to identify explanations that are inconsistent with 
actual circumstances. Given a seemingly plausible client-provided explanation, auditors 
could fail to complete step two accurately, independent confirmation that the hypothesis 
fits the circumstances. The current study uses an explanation that is consistent with the 
change in account balance, yet inconsistent with the actual facts (as evidenced by changes 
in other account balances). To identify the explanation as implausible, auditors must 
search beyond the account of interest.  
Prior research suggests that experienced auditors can detect implausible 
explanations when source objectivity is manipulated at two levels: client and some other 
outside source (e.g., decision aid, external third party, audit team member) (Anderson et 
al. 2003; Bamber 1983; Hirst 1994; Joyce and Biddle 1981). None considers the case 
where the client is a former audit team member. In the current study, the auditor’s 
judgment of the client’s objectivity depends on both the client’s former position as a 
fellow audit team member and the client’s current position within his or her firm. The 
client’s former position with the audit firm should increase the client’s objectivity 
because the client (former auditor) has an understanding of proper financial statement 
preparation and of the importance of providing a high-quality audit. The client’s current 
position with the firm could decrease objectivity because the client could be motivated by 
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bonuses and promotions related to strong financial results. In addition, the client could 
also be motivated to falsify financial statements in order to cover up fraud. 
2.2.3 Source Reliability Judgments 
 Auditors weigh client explanations based on their assessment of the client’s 
source reliability. The source reliability judgment includes an evaluation of both 
competence and objectivity (Bamber 1983; Hirst 1994). According to Hirst (1994), 
“…competence means an individual’s ability to measure or interpret an item or event 
accurately. Objectivity means the likelihood an individual will report his measurement or 
interpretation truthfully, regardless of its accuracy” (p.114). Ceteris paribus, the level of 
source reliability increases with the level of competence, as well as with the degree of 
objectivity. 
Source reliability judgments include an evaluation of both competence and 
objectivity. Therefore, any bias that impairs auditor judgment about either the 
competence or the objectivity of a source could reduce the audit’s effectiveness and 
increase audit risk. When evaluating the competence of a client who was once an audit 
team member, the auditor’s past interaction with that individual on audit engagements, as 
well as the auditor’s knowledge of firm training and promotion policies, should result in 
an accurate competence judgment. Further, an individual’s competence is unlikely to 
decrease when he or she goes to work for a client firm.  
Unlike competence, objectivity is subject to situational pressures. Clients, 
although knowledgeable, might not be objective (Hirst 1994). Compensation plans, 
promotion opportunities, and stock options provide motivation for clients to report 
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untruthfully. AU 316, “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit” requires 
auditors to evaluate client assertions with professional skepticism, directing them to 
inquire about management incentives, pressures and motivations (AICPA 2005). 
Auditors must consider how these motivations can influence clients to provide untruthful 
explanations. When evaluating the objectivity of a former audit team member, the current 
auditor must consider how the ex-auditor’s objectivity may have changed, and how that 
change may affect the client’s overall source reliability. 
2.2.4 Clients’ Insider Knowledge of Audit Process 
The potential for client deception is especially relevant when the client is a former 
member of the current audit firm. A significant threat to financial reporting involves the 
ex-auditor’s specialized knowledge of the continuing audit firm’s processes and 
operations (Beasley et al. 2000). As a former audit team member, the client knows which 
tasks lower-level auditors complete. He or she can apply this knowledge strategically to 
hide his or her misdeeds, using certain accounts assigned to novice team members. 
Further, the client knows the audit firm’s internal procedures for determining materiality, 
evaluating evidence, and conducting substantive testing. While AICPA Ethics 
Interpretation 101-2 contains a requirement that the ongoing engagement team consider 
the necessity to modify engagement procedures, insider information does increase the 
risk that the client can anticipate and subvert those procedures. Admittedly, although a 
client might attempt to deceive the auditor, successful deception depends on the auditor’s 
inability to detect the deception. The focus of this paper remains on the auditor’s 
judgment of the plausibility of client explanations; the above discussion merely 
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highlights the increased potential for a client to plan his deception, as well as the need for 
auditors to effectively detect deception when it occurs. 
2.3 Auditor Affiliation and Related Studies 
Lack of independence is an often-cited cause of audit failure. In some salient audit 
failures, the top executives at the client corporations were also past employees of the 
firms that audited them. For example, in the Enron case, both Richard Causey, Chief 
Accounting Officer, and Sherron Watkins, Vice President, were Andersen alumni 
(Barrionuevo 2002). Being past employees of the audit firm, the concern is that these key 
client personnel are able to exercise undue influence on the auditor, thereby impairing 
auditor independence. The federal government has responded to the auditor affiliation 
threat to independence by restricting the employment options of audit team members 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 2002). In addition, AICPA Ethics Interpretation 101-2 has 
identified the hiring of an external auditor by the client firm to be a threat to 
independence and suggests several mitigation techniques (AICPA 2005). 
As displayed in Figure 2, the timing of an auditor affiliation can occur in one of 
three ways (Lennox 2005). This study focuses on employment affiliations (Panel B), 
which arise when the client company hires a member of the recurring external audit team. 
There are two reasons I focus on employment affiliations. First, they are the most 
common (Lennox 2005). Second, they are particularly susceptible to bias because the 
auditor goes directly from being a member of the audit team to being an audit client. This 
change in circumstance could alter the ex-auditor’s motivations, and potentially, his or 
her objectivity.  
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Figure 2 
Auditor Affiliations 
(Lennox 2005, 212)  
 
Panel A: The timing of chance affiliations 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: The timing of employment affiliations 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: The timing of alma mater affiliations  
 
  
  
 It is common for clients to hire employees from their current audit firm. In fact, 
the relationship between audit firm and client has been referred to as a “revolving door” 
(Bleed 2002, 1). Three benefits accrue from hiring former external auditors (Beasley et 
al. 2000). First, auditors are often highly trained by their firms. Second, auditors 
commonly have had exposure to varied clients, businesses, and complex financial 
transactions. Third, a client company’s former auditors have an insider’s knowledge of 
the client’s current strategies and corporate environment and therefore can quickly 
acclimate themselves to client practices.  
Individual leaves 
audit firm
Company selects 
audit firm
Individual joins 
client company 
Company selects 
audit firm
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audit firm
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audit firm
Individual joins 
client company
Company selects 
audit firm 
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Beasley et al. (2000) also identify three threats to the financial reporting process 
associated with such hirings. While one of these threats relates to the potential for auditor 
shirking before hiring, two relate to the time period after the auditor is hired. The first 
threat, detailed previously in Section 2.2.4, relates to the client’s advantage over the 
auditor. The ex-auditor’s intimate knowledge of the audit firm’s plans and procedures 
logically makes it easier for him or her to successfully hide improprieties in the financial 
statements from the current auditors. The second threat and the focus of this study, stems 
from the effect of an in-group bias, explained later in Section 2.4.2, which causes the 
auditor to overestimate the client’s objectivity, leading to underauditing. This bias can 
cause a reluctance of the current auditors to question the assertions of clients who were 
once their co-workers. 
Although auditor affiliation threats have attracted the interest of regulators, 
researchers have published little on the subject. Lennox (2004, 202) observes that “…no 
published archival evidence exists on the types of affiliations or whether affiliations 
impair audit quality.” Using an estimation model to identify companies whose 
unfavorable opinion probabilities are greater than 10%, Lennox partitions these 
companies based on the presence or absence of an affiliated executive. Findings suggest 
that firms with affiliated executives were statistically more likely to have a clean audit 
opinion. Menon and Williams (2004) examined cases where the affiliated client was a 
former audit firm partner. Using an archival approach, after controlling for performance 
characteristics, they found evidence of an affiliation effect. Firms employing former audit 
partners were more likely to have larger abnormal accruals. In addition, they noted an 
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affiliation effect on earnings such that firms with former affiliated partners were more 
likely to just meet analysts’ earnings forecasts than were firms without former affiliated 
partners. While the above studies examine correlations between affiliation and external 
measured variables, the current study uses an experimental approach to explore the effect 
of staff and senior auditor affiliation on individual audit judgments. 
2.4 Auditing Judgment: Biases and Social Identity Theory 
2.4.1 Biases in Auditing Judgments 
 Much has been written regarding the process, and particularly the weakness of 
human judgment and decision-making (Bamber et al. 1995; Hogarth 1980; Kahneman et 
al. 1982; Libby 1991). One such weakness is bias, defined as “a preference or an 
inclination, especially one that inhibits impartial judgment” (American Heritage 2000). 
Biases can be strategic (individuals are conscious of their bias) or implicit (individuals 
are unaware of their bias). Auditors’ professional skepticism likely prevents them from 
exhibiting strategic biases; however, implicit biases may persist.4 Bias identification is 
particularly important in auditing since auditors are required to make many judgments, 
the results of which can significantly impact multiple stakeholders. For example, if an 
auditor incorrectly believes there is sufficient evidence to support an account balance 
(overweighting), he could wrongly curtail further testing on that account. While a single 
judgment error is not likely to increase risk considerably, the final audit opinion is the 
                                                 
4 For a discussion of the two types of biases, see Kunda (1990). 
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sum of multiple judgments; therefore, the cumulative effect of these errors could 
significantly increase the risk of an audit failure (Moeckel and Plumlee 1989).  
Some frequently researched biases in the audit literature include: anchoring and 
adjustment (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992), primacy/recency effects (Kahneman et al. 
1982), base rate frequency (Tuttle 1996), common information-sampling bias (O'Donnell 
et al. 2000), and information search strategy (Kida 1984). The roots of these biases reside 
in the psychology field. However, Bamber et al. (1995) suggest that auditing has unique 
attributes that prevent the blanket application of psychology findings to auditors. Indeed, 
research results are mixed. While auditors performed better than non-auditors in a 
representativeness judgment (Joyce and Biddle 1981), and demonstrated a better 
understanding of subpopulation error rates (Tuttle 1996), in anchoring and adjustment 
studies they exhibited a recency effect consistent with general psychology findings 
(Bamber et al. 1995). Although auditors are professionals, trained to detect errors and 
misstatements, they are still human, and as such, demonstrate many of the biases long 
established through years of psychology research. 
2.4.2 Social Identity Theory  
 In-group bias, based on Social Identity Theory, influences human decision-
making in social contexts (Tajfel 1981). This theory proposes that group members are an 
extension of the self, and as such, each group member has a “…systematic tendency to 
evaluate…(his)… own membership group (the in-group) or its members more favorably 
than a nonmembership group (the out-group) or its members” (Hewstone et al. 2002, 
576). In-group bias, characterized by one’s unquestioning belief in the assertions of a 
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fellow group member, provides an individual with a positive social identity, thereby 
satisfying his need for self-esteem (Hewstone et al. 2002). This bias is quite robust. 
Oakes et al. (1994) note that discriminatory behavior and attitudes can be brought about 
by a mere cognitive division of people into groups. Towry (2003) successfully 
manipulated team identity simply through the use of colored props and seating 
assignments.  
 Auditors become part of an audit firm’s in-group when they are hired. As they 
work together on the same audit team, they develop familiarity through repeated 
interactions, increasing the level of in-group bonding. Although auditors who eventually 
leave the firm to go work for a client are technically no longer members of the audit 
team, this change in employment does not necessarily exclude them from the audit in-
group. Levine et al. (1998) notes that individuals may simultaneously be members of 
multiple groups. When an auditor becomes a client, the remaining audit team members 
may view the ex-auditor as part of both the client and the audit groups. Therefore, even 
after auditors go to work for a client, remaining audit team members could continue to 
identify them as group members; they are, in fact, still working together on the same 
audit, albeit on opposite sides. 
2.4.3 Inter-group Bias in Social Psychology 
According to Apfelbaum and Lubek (1979), three characteristics define inter-
group bias. First, in-group members view themselves as a homogeneous group; second, 
in-group members view out-group members as a homogeneous group; and third, in-group 
members view themselves as different from out-group members. Inter-group bias causes 
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people to draw distinctions based on group membership, rather than on individual traits. 
Inter-group bias can take the form of in-group trust or out-group derogation. In-group 
favoritism results in the “extension of trust, positive regard, cooperation, and empathy to 
in-group, but not out-group members” (Hewstone et al. 2002, 578). Out-group derogation 
is the underlying source of stereotyping and discrimination. Interestingly, much of the 
psychology research seeks to reduce out-group derogation, and, in turn, reduce the inter-
group conflict (Hewstone et al. 2002; Tajfel 1981). In this study, the focus lies not with 
unwarranted out-group skepticism, but with unjustified in-group trust. The danger comes 
from overweighting assertions made by an in-group member, not from underweighting 
assertions made by an out-group member. 
Self and social identity theories are often used to explain an individual’s behavior 
in groups (Ellemers et al. 2002; Oakes et al. 1994; Tajfel 1981). Ellemers et al. (2002) 
presents a taxonomy of the primary concerns and motives of the social self. The two axes 
are level of group commitment (high and low) and level of perceived threat (none, 
individual, and group). The taxonomy in Figure 3 details concerns and motives for each 
response. For the purposes of this study, I classify auditors with a rank of senior and 
below auditors as belonging to Cell #4: high commitment to the group and exposure to 
individual-directed threats. While there is no prior research to directly support this 
classification, these auditors are likely to be highly committed to their firm; seniors have 
chosen to stay with their firms by accepting promotions and have been given additional 
responsibilities within the firm, and staff members have just completed years of training 
and study, as well as a competitive interview process. The individual threat is one of 
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exclusion from the group (e.g., being fired). These auditors are more likely to make 
decisions that further their acceptance as part of the group than decisions that might lead 
to their rejection by the group.  
Figure 3 
Primary concerns and motives of the social self: a taxonomy 
(Ellemers et al. 2002, 167) 
 
 Group Commitment 
 Low High 
No threat 1. 2. 
     Concern: Accuracy/efficiency Social meaning 
     Motive: Noninvolvement Identity expression 
Individual-directed threat 3. 4. 
     Concern: Categorization Exclusion 
     Motive: Self-affirmation Acceptance 
Group-directed threat 5. 6. 
     Concern: Value Distinctiveness, value 
     Motive: Individual mobility Group-affirmation 
 
Ellemers et al. (2002, 173) points out that new group members “…tend to be more 
anxious and lack confidence reflecting acceptance concerns….” I surmise that this lack of 
confidence could negatively affect an auditor’s professional skepticism, causing him to 
be reluctant to question affiliated clients, an idea echoed by Beasley et al. (2000).  
Within a single organization, there are both in-group and out-group members. 
Napier and Ferris (1993) note that, among other factors, the higher the perceived 
similarity between supervisors and subordinates, the lower the psychological distance. In 
turn, “…less Psychological Distance is associated with greater attraction and liking, 
greater subordinate satisfaction, and higher supervisor evaluations of subordinate 
performance” (Napier and Ferris 1993, 333). Given these benefits, it is likely that staff 
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and senior auditors would seek to nurture perceived similarity between themselves and 
their superiors, including the former auditor who is now a client. 
2.4.4 In-group Bias in Auditing 
 An extensive literature search revealed only one behavioral study on the effects of 
in-group bias among auditors. King (2002) challenged the idea that auditors are 
subservient to self-serving biases, and that they are unable to objectively audit a client 
upon whose business they depend. In an experiment, he created a strong group identity 
among the auditors by having them meet frequently with each other. This strong identity 
resulted in the auditors’ increased ability to detect client deceptions. Auditors in the weak 
group treatment interacted primarily with clients and were less likely to detect client 
deception. The team identity in the strong group “…motivates auditors to focus more on 
the collective goal of conducting appropriate audits” (King 2002, 267). The result was 
that this motivation overcame the auditor’s self-serving biases.5  
 In the above study, auditors’ in-group bias toward other auditors resulted in better 
audits yet individuals belong to many groups simultaneously, resulting in differing 
degrees of group identity (Ellemers et al. 2002). I might identify myself as a graduate of a 
particular university, an accountant, an auditor, an employee of a large audit firm, and 
specifically, an employee of a particular firm. Depending on how strongly I identify with 
each group, I will exhibit a concomitant level of in-group bias. In an auditor/client 
relationship, auditors may view clients as fellow group members based on their common 
                                                 
5 A self-serving bias in this case is defined as the auditor’s need to please the client so that the client will 
continue to contract with the auditor for services. 
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socio-economic class, college alma mater, religious affiliation, or, where the client was 
once an auditor. In the case of employment affiliation, the auditor could still view the ex-
auditor, now the client, as an audit firm group member. 
 In-group bias is particularly relevant in auditing because it can affect the auditor’s 
professional skepticism. For example, analytical procedures often require auditors to 
gather and evaluate explanations from clients. A key part of this evaluation involves the 
auditor’s ability to judge the client’s objectivity correctly, and the effect that objectivity 
has on the client’s truthfulness. In the context of the current study, clients were also once 
fellow auditors, thus confounding group identity. A likely outcome is that auditors will 
continue to identify affiliated clients with their former audit group and thus will fail to 
adjust their assessment of the client’s objectivity appropriately. The resulting 
unwarranted trust could cause the auditor to accept the client’s implausible explanation, 
resulting in an incorrect audit judgment.  
2.4.5 A Normative View  
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards require auditors to approach an audit 
engagement with professional skepticism; the notion that a seemingly irrelevant past 
association could result in unjustified bias is a cause for concern. It is important to 
investigate whether this past relationship is truly irrelevant.  
Hirst (1994) suggests that both competence and objectivity should be considered 
in a source reliability judgment. Based on an insider’s knowledge of hiring criteria, 
professional certifications, firm training and evaluation procedures, along with the direct 
experience of working together, auditors should correctly assess their former co-worker’s 
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competence. The validity of this assessment should not change regardless of the fellow 
co-worker’s employment. Auditors must also assess a client’s objectivity -- an 
individual’s motivation to communicate his beliefs honestly. In fulfilling their obligation 
to reduce the risk that accompanies the principal-agent relationship characteristic of 
owners and managers, auditors must maintain objectivity. Auditor objectivity arises from 
the motivation to provide a quality audit.  Contrary to this, client bias arises from the 
motivation to present the financial statements in the best possible light. Because of this 
difference in motivations, it is likely that a client’s representations are more biased (less 
objective) than those of an auditor.  
2.5 Statement of Hypotheses – In-group Bias 
The first part of this study tests whether staff and senior auditors demonstrate in-
group bias when assessing a client-provided explanation. As noted earlier, senior 
auditors’ experience should enable them to detect an implausible explanation. However, 
senior auditors’ tenure with the firm should lead to a strong in-group association. Staff 
auditors, although less experienced, have a need for acceptance by the group and are 
likely to align themselves with established group members. Staff members could either 
seek to impress the audit team by demonstrating skepticism of client explanations or 
could view the client as part of the audit firm in-group and thus be reluctant to question 
the assertions. In sum, both levels have the potential to exhibit in-group bias. Given that 
arguments exist for and against in-group bias at each level, I make no formal hypotheses 
about level. Rather I make a general proposal that in-group bias persists from the original 
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association between the client and auditor, making the auditor more likely to overrate the 
plausibility of a client explanation. 
The following hypothesis tests for a simple effect of in-group bias. 
H1: Given an implausible explanation, auditors will judge that 
explanation as more plausible when it comes from an in-group 
client, than when it comes from an out-group client. 
 
Auditors also must express confidence in their judgments. Rose (2002, 114) notes 
that individuals may exhibit either overconfidence (“…increases in confidence without 
the associated improvements in decision quality…”), or underconfidence (failure of the 
individual to recognize when the decision is accurate). General psychology research finds 
overwhelmingly that individuals are overconfident (Fischoff 1982). In the audit literature, 
findings on confidence are mixed (Ahlawat 1999; Bamber and Ramsay 2000; Einhorn 
and Hogarth 1978; Moeckel and Plumlee 1989). Tomassini et al. (1982) find that auditors 
demonstrate less overconfidence than suggested by the general psychology literature for 
an audit-related task. Solomon et al. (1982) find that auditors were underconfident in an 
audit task; however, similar to general psychology findings, were overconfident in a 
general knowledge task. In an audit evidence recall task, Moeckel and Plumlee (1989) 
find that participants are equally confident in their inaccurate memories as in their 
accurate memories. Bamber (1995) suggests that there is some underlying, unknown 
reason for underconfidence in an audit context.  
 Given that auditors would not expect an in-group client to present an implausible 
explanation, they may question their own judgment, causing their confidence to be lower 
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than it would be if the implausible explanation came from an out-group client. This 
discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Given an implausible explanation, auditors will be less 
confident in their initial plausibility judgment when the 
explanation comes from an in-group client than when it comes 
from an out-group client. 
 
Auditors rely on their judgments to adjust future audit plans (Cohen and Kida 
1989). It is important to evaluate whether in-group bias has an effect on auditors’ 
decisions to extend or curtail further testing. Auditors who correctly identify an 
explanation as implausible could still suspend testing on that item because a fellow group 
member supplied the explanation. To explain further, an auditor could believe that a 
client explanation is implausible, but not believe that the client is intentionally lying. An 
auditor who has an in-group relationship with the client could still choose to extend 
testing; however, this extension of testing could be less than if the auditor did not have an 
in-group relationship with the client. In-group bias could result in an auditor deciding to 
give a fellow group member “the benefit of the doubt.” On the other hand, an auditor who 
receives an implausible explanation from an in-group client could believe that the client 
is intentionally lying and compensate for this discovered deception by increasing testing. 
I propose that consistent with in-group bias, an auditor will extend testing by less when 
the client is an in-group member than when the client is an out-group member.6 
H3: Given an implausible explanation, auditors who correctly 
identify an explanation as implausible will extend testing less 
when the client is an in- group member than when the client is 
an out-group member. 
                                                 
6 This hypothesis refers to decisions without benefit of a decision aid; however, auditors may reassess their 
decision after using a decision aid. I test this hypothesis pre and post-decision aid. 
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2.6 Discussion of Potential Covariates 
 I consider the following potential covariates for inclusion in the model: perception 
of client competence, prior task experience, and prior experience with affiliated clients.7  
Hirst (1994) finds that competence and objectivity interact in an auditor’s determination 
of source reliability. To control for this possible interaction, I measure each participant’s 
perceived client competence rating. I plan to compare these ratings across groups to rule 
out a competence effect on auditor judgments, confidence, and decisions.  
 Prior research finds that task experience is positively related to performance on 
audit tasks in general, as well as on analytical procedures (Hirst and Koonce 1996; 
Kaplan et al. 1992; Libby and Frederick 1990). Thus, auditors who are experienced in 
analytical procedures are likely to give lower plausibility judgments than are auditors 
with less experience. Given that the sample includes auditors from staff through senior 
levels, it is reasonable to assume that participants have varying levels of experience with 
procedures. Therefore, I include a measure of analytical procedures experience as a 
potential covariate in the model.  
 An auditor’s prior experience with affiliated clients could impact their attention to 
the group manipulation, and as a result, affect their judgment. For example, an auditor 
who has no prior experience working with an affiliated client could interpret the in-group 
manipulation as unusual. This interpretation could lead him or her to weight the in-group 
factor more than an auditor who had prior experience with affiliated clients. Accordingly, 
                                                 
7All covariates are measured post-task to avoid confounds within the research design.   
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I ask for participants’ prior experience working with affiliated clients for inclusion in the 
model as a potential covariate. 
If auditors exhibit in-group bias, and this bias potentially increases audit risk, it is 
valuable to examine whether there is a tool to mitigate this bias effectively and 
efficiently. In sections 2.7 – 2.10, I develop an argument that a valid, objective decision 
aid will be successful in mitigating in-group bias. 
2.7 Debiasing In Auditing 
Multiple techniques exist for debiasing in an audit environment. Justification 
(Peecher 1996), counterexplanation (Kennedy 1995), accountability (Kennedy 1993; 
Tetlock 1983), documentation (Ballou 2001) and the review process (Brazel et al. 2004; 
Trotman 1985) all influence the auditor’s judgment and performance on audit tasks. 
Although research has shown the prior methods to be effective, there are three 
noteworthy drawbacks to using them. First, since the cost of an audit depends on the 
number of hours worked, efficiency is of key importance. The review process, while 
effective, takes both the auditor’s and the reviewer’s time. Second, review and 
documentation procedures are detective or corrective controls -- they do not prevent staff 
members from making initial errors in judgment. Third, because individuals implement 
these methods, execution could be inconsistent, resulting in more audit risk. 
Decision aids are not subject to the above drawbacks. Abdolmohammadi and 
Usoff (2001) find that practitioners identify a multitude of audit tasks that are well-suited 
to the use of decision aids. Rose (2002) notes that decision aids can mitigate systematic 
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information-processing biases.8 By their nature, they offer a consistent, objective 
recommendation to the auditor (Ashton 1992). This consistency reduces variability in 
both an individual auditor’s judgments, as well as auditors’ judgments firm-wide. 
Although decision aids do not completely prevent incorrect judgments, they can provide 
auditors with suggestions and direction. 
2.8 Debiasing and Improving Judgment and Decisions with Decision Aids  
Several studies establish the effectiveness of decision aids in mitigating audit 
judgment biases and improving audit judgments overall (Butler 1985; Eining et al. 1997; 
Emby and Finley 1997; Rose and Rose 2003). Butler (1985) developed a decision aid that 
focused the user’s attention away from specifics and to a broader view of the situation. 
Since analytical procedures require auditors to consider the interrelationships among 
accounts, a decision aid that informs the user about these interrelationships should 
improve judgments. Eining et al. (1997) find that for a complex task (fraud detection) an 
expert system with a constructive dialogue feature is effective in improving judgments. 
The authors considered a combination of characteristics from the psychology literature to 
design a constructive dialogue feature that would increase decision aid reliance. Increased 
reliance led not only to improved assessments, but also to improved decisions. Emby and 
Finley (1997) successfully used an evidence rating technique to mitigate framing effects 
for internal control assessments and decisions.  
                                                 
8 Decision aids can create new judgment biases, especially in the presence of other debiasing strategies 
such as accountability and incentives (Ashton 1990). For a discussion of the literature on decision aids, see 
Rose (2002).  
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Decision aids can effectively mitigate biases in auditing. Kennedy’s (1993; 1995) 
framework classifies biases as either “data-related” or “effort-related.” Effort-related 
biases occur when the decision-maker has either insufficient capacity or insufficient 
motivation to complete the task. Suggested solutions include increasing internal capacity, 
providing incentives, or introducing accountability. Data-related biases occur when either 
internal or external information (or both) are imprecise. Internal data (individual 
memory) is the source for individual biases such as framing (Emby and Finley 1997), 
first impression bias (Lim et al. 2000), and anchoring and adjustment (George et al. 
2000). External data biases arise when the information provided to the individual is 
unclear, irrelevant, or presented in complex format. In the current study, I classify in-
group bias as an internal data bias because the in-group influence arises from the 
individual’s biased perception of the affiliated client’s trustworthiness.  
Both Kennedy (1995) and Roy and Lerch (1996) suggest the following solutions 
to minimize data-related bias. First, firms can modify information presentation. This 
approach is used successfully by Lim et al. (2000) to reduce reinterpretation of secondary 
data (a framing bias) and present the secondary data in such a way that it could not be 
ignored. Second, firms can train individuals to use appropriate information processing 
strategies. Firms can provide feedback during a task so that individuals can adjust their 
decision processes and subsequently apply the improved process to similar situations. 
Eining et al. (1997) uses this approach in designing a decision aid that includes 
constructive dialogue. Third, firms can replace decision-makers with a model that 
suggests a normative answer. Libby and Libby (1989) find less variability and better 
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performance when auditors used a decision aid to combine multiple judgments into a 
global answer. Rose and Rose (2003) also find that decision aids mitigated recency bias 
in an audit evidence evaluation task. 
In this study, in-group bias involves a subconscious leaning toward believing an 
in-group member. The debiasing agent will display information in a structured format, as 
well as provide cues to guide the auditor in his search for support. I discuss the decision 
aid design in Section 3.5.2. 
2.9 Decision Aid Reliance in Auditing 
Technology use is increasing in today’s audit process. A longitudinal survey of 
auditors indicates an increase in the number of audit tasks that are amenable to the 
application of a decision aid (Abdolmohammadi and Usoff 2001). Audit firms use a 
variety of decision aids, decision support systems, and expert systems in the audit process 
(Abdolmohammadi and Usoff 2001; Bedard and Graham 2002). Relevant decision aid 
studies find that reliance is influenced by face validity (Ashton 1990), and source 
objectivity (Anderson et al. 2003; Lim et al. 2000). A decision aid’s face validity refers to 
the users’ assessment of  “the extent to which it appears sensible and reasonable” (Ashton 
1990, 170). Source objectivity refers to the trustworthiness of the decision aid’s source. 
 Ye and Johnson (1995) find that auditors are more likely to accept expert system 
advice if the advice is reasonable. In addition, the study finds that justification, described 
as “…an explicit description of the causal argument or rationale behind each inferential 
step taken by the ES” is most effective in user acceptance of expert systems (Ye and 
Johnson 1995, 158). Justification requires auditors to have a deep understanding of 
 31  
accounting; in this study, auditors must be familiar with the relationships among 
accounts, in order to judge the decision aid predictions as reasonable. Ye and Johnson 
(1995) posit that decision aid reasonableness increases the auditor’s confidence in the aid, 
and thus increases the probability that the auditor will rely on the aid. As noted above, 
Eining et al. (1997) successfully increase decision aid reliance by incorporating a 
constructive dialogue feature in their decision aid. However, there is ample evidence in 
the literature that decision makers do not always rely on decision aids (Rose 2002). 
Individuals may work around the decision aid (Kachelmeier and Messier 1990) or try to 
outperform the decision aid (Arkes et al. 1986). Thus, there is a possibility that auditors 
will not rely on a decision aid. 
Anderson et al. (2003) find that auditors judged decision aid explanations as more 
sufficient than client-provided explanations, when, in fact, such explanations were 
insufficient. Overreliance on the decision aid resulted from the auditor’s assessment of 
the decision aid’s objectivity. Since validity and objectivity are both important to 
decision aid reliance, I will confirm that participants judged the decision aid in the study 
to be both valid and objective. 
2.10 Statement of Hypotheses – Decision Improvement 
Auditor judgments can be influenced by in-group bias, as posited above. 
However, factors other than group biases can also negatively impact auditor judgments. 
For example, even auditors who receive an implausible explanation from a non-affiliated 
client can incorrectly accept the explanation as plausible. This error in judgment can arise 
from the auditor’s reliance on perceived client competence. In other words, an auditor 
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can successfully complete step one of the plausibility check (plausibility of hypothesis 
given the change in account balance), yet fail to complete step two (plausibility of the 
hypothesis given other, external information) successfully. A decision aid that redirects 
the auditor’s attention to other possible hypotheses (similar to the approaches of Lim et 
al. (2000) and Butler (1985)) should improve auditor judgments. Further, a decision aid 
that provides reasonable justification (as found by Ye and Johnson (1995)) should result 
in auditor reliance, which is necessary for audit judgment improvement. I propose that a 
decision aid will improve auditor judgment by directing auditors’ attention to the 
implausibility of the client-provided explanation.  The decision aid will provide more 
information, lowering cognitive effort, as suggested by Kennedy (1993). Finally, auditors 
should judge a firm-developed decision aid as more valid and objective, causing them to 
weight the decision aid’s recommendation more than the client’s explanation, as 
evidenced in Anderson et al. (2003).  
Hypothesis 4 tests the effectiveness of decision aid use on auditors who initially 
incorrectly judge plausibility to be high.  
H4: Given an implausible explanation, auditors who make an 
initial incorrect judgment will decrease their plausibility 
judgment after using a decision aid.  
 
Ahlawat (1999) finds that confidence increases with an increase in the amount of 
information provided. The decision aid report provides additional information to the 
auditor by directing his or her attention to alternative explanations and expected 
relationships among relevant accounts. Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) provide a model for  
belief adjustment that addresses how beliefs change when new information is received. 
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Srivastava and Mock (2004) suggest that an auditor’s belief assessment regarding audit 
evidence includes three components: first, the belief that the evidence supports the 
conclusion, second, the belief that it supports an opposing conclusion, and third, the 
ambiguity related to unknown information. As auditors gather new information the 
amount of ambiguity decreases and they can classify information as confirming or 
disconfirming. As ambiguity about the judgment decreases, auditors should feel more 
certain about their decisions. Ye and Johnson (1995) suggest that the use and acceptance 
of decision aid recommendations will improve user confidence. Chung and Monroe 
(2000) find that judgment confidence decreases as perceived task difficulty increases. 
Use of a decision aid should reduce cognitive effort and therefore reduce task difficulty. 
As task difficulty decreases, I expect confidence to increase. In this study, the decision 
aid offers feedback by providing expected relationships between relevant accounts. 
Auditors who have the requisite accounting knowledge and rely on the decision aid 
should recognize whether their prior judgment was correct. If they were initially 
incorrect, this realization should lead them to the correct answer, about which they should 
be confident. If they were initially correct, reliance on the decision aid reinforces their 
original answer and should also increase confidence. I propose the following hypothesis. 
H5: Auditors will be more confident in their post-decision aid 
plausibility judgment than in their pre-decision aid plausibility 
judgment.  
 
Finally, I explore the effect of decision aid reliance on auditor decisions to extend 
testing. Based on the reasoning used for Hypothesis 4, a logical result of the change in 
plausibility judgment is a change in extent of testing. Auditors who rely on the decision 
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aid, and subsequently change their judgment of the client explanation from plausible to 
implausible, should logically adjust their extent of testing to reflect their revised belief. 
Eining et al. (1997) noted that not only did auditors improve their judgments after using a 
decision aid, but they also improved their subsequent decisions. Bukszar (2003) finds that 
individuals treat decisions with more consideration than they do judgments.9 In a forecast 
and investment task, he finds that individuals perform an additional evaluation step 
between making a judgment and making a decision, which results in individuals being 
likely to act on their accurate judgments. In an audit context, it is important to explore the 
effect of a decision aid not only on judgments, but on subsequent decisions.  
 Auditors who initially judge a client explanation plausible, will likely extend 
testing little, if at all. Post decision-aid, auditors who reevaluate their decision and 
conclude that the client explanation is implausible, will likely increase testing. Further, an 
auditor who changes his or her plausibility judgment to implausible will also likely 
reassess the client’s objectivity, also leading to a decision to increase testing.  Therefore, 
I propose the following hypothesis. 
H6:  Given an implausible explanation, auditors who make an 
initial incorrect judgment will increase their extent of testing 
after using a decision aid. 
                                                 
9 A judgment is an individual’s inference about an external event or phenomenon.  A decision is an 
individual’s choice of action (Hastie 2001). 
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
3.1 Introduction 
 This section details the experimental method. I first justify the sample selection, 
noting that seniors and staff members both have the potential to exhibit in-group bias for 
different reasons. Then I discuss the choice and design of analytical procedures as the 
experimental task. Analytical review of expenses is an appropriate task for staff and 
senior auditors and it is amenable to decision aid development (Abdolmohammadi 1999).  
 I proceed to discuss the research design, detailing the procedure, instrument 
development, and measurement of dependent variables. I include a discussion of the 
client explanation, noting that the explanation is reasonable given the related change in 
account balance, but implausible given the change in related accounts. I describe the 
establishment of the between-subjects manipulation - group affiliation, and the creation 
of the within-subjects treatment – decision aid. I describe the dependent variable scales, 
noting their use by prior researchers in the audit literature.  
 Finally, I include a discussion of threats to internal and external validity, noting 
how this study addresses those threats. I follow with a discussion of manipulation checks. 
I also describe the pilot study. Finally, I detail planned statistical analyses.  
3.2 Sample 
Participants are staff and senior auditors. I chose staff auditors because, as noted, 
clients will likely use their inside knowledge to deceive less-experienced (novice) 
auditors. Further, analytical procedures are often completed by assistant auditors 
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(Abdolmohammadi 1999). I chose senior auditors to explore whether in-group bias 
affects multiple levels within the firm. Seniors, because of their experience, should 
accurately detect implausible explanations. However, their longer affiliation with the firm 
may increase their in-group bias. The use of auditors (as opposed to audit students) is 
necessary to establish the in-group treatment. Auditors have had time to develop in-group 
feelings toward their co-workers, and should also have sufficient task experience.  
Online access to the experimental materials simplified data collection from 
various locations. I recruited participants from several national CPA firms. All 
participation was voluntary; I contacted firms and asked them to distribute the web link to 
their staff through senior auditors, along with a letter endorsing the study. I provided no 
incentives for performance; however, participants were asked to voluntarily provide 
contact information if they wanted individual feedback. To encourage completion, I 
allowed participants to direct a $5.00 donation to their choice of charity (from a select 
list).  
3.3 Experimental Task 
The experimental task required an auditor to perform an analytical procedure on 
the repair and maintenance expense account during the substantive testing phase of the 
audit. There are three reasons for this choice of task: it is appropriate for staff through 
senior auditors, expense accounts have been used to hide fraud (high inherent risk), and 
the analytical procedure related to expenses is amenable to decision aid use. First, 
auditors identify this task as appropriate for a staff auditor to conduct (Abdolmohammadi 
1999). Second, asset misappropriation often occurs in expense accounts (Hall 2004). 
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Third, analysis of repair and maintenance expense is a substantive testing task that is 
amenable to the development of decision support systems (Abdolmohammadi 1999). 
Analytical procedures are a semi-structured task; they include a reasonably well-defined 
problem, with limited alternatives, requiring some judgment (Abdolmohammadi 1991). 
Although a decision aid can list plausible reasons for an account balance fluctuation, 
auditors must also consider many intangible, non-financial factors that cannot or typically 
are not covered by a decision aid. Auditors must use their judgment to make a final 
determination regarding the likelihood that a given explanation is plausible.  
Task materials included a narrative description of the firm, a copy of the current 
and prior year’s financial statements (with the unexpected increase in the repair and 
maintenance expense account highlighted), a description of the client’s background (to 
establish the varying group treatments), and the client’s explanation for the unexpected 
fluctuation.10 After the first measurements, participants had access to a decision aid.11 
3.4 Research Design 
3.4.1 Procedure 
 Figure 4 details the mixed research design with one between-subjects factor 
(group affiliation) and one within-subjects factor (decision aid). Prior to completing the 
task, participants filled out an online informed consent, as well as a demographic 
questionnaire to elicit the identity of their current employer, as well as their level in the 
                                                 
10 Overstatement of expenses is often an indication of asset misappropriation; a fraud which is more likely 
to be committed by mid to lower management (Hall 2004), such as a controller or assistant controller.  
11 The decision aid was labeled as “firm developed”, but was developed by the author and was the same 
decision aid for all participants. 
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firm (staff or senior).12 It was necessary to gather this information before the experiment 
to operationalize the group manipulation. I randomly assigned participants to either an in-
group or an out-group treatment (the difference between in-group and out-group was the 
client representative’s history). For in-group participants, the client was a former 
employee of the participants’ audit firm, for out-group members, the client was a long-
time employee of the client firm. 
Figure 4  
Diagram of the Experimental Design 
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All participants then had access to the above-referenced task materials. They 
made the following judgments: plausibility of the client’s explanation (scale of 0 – 100), 
their confidence in that judgment (scale of 0 – 100), and whether and how much to 
extend testing on that item (number of hours). After making those judgments, participants 
were shown a decision aid report (attributed to their firm’s national office research 
department), as well as to the materials provided earlier. They then answered the same 
                                                 
12 Demographics also include age, gender, certifications held, and highest education level. 
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questions regarding plausibility, confidence, and extent of testing. A post-test 
questionnaire included manipulation checks and further measures that may be significant, 
including the participants’ perceptions of client competence, prior analytical procedures 
experience, and experience with affiliated clients. At the conclusion of the online 
experiment, participants were thanked for their participation and were allowed to direct a 
contribution to a charity of their choosing. 
3.4.2 Characterization of Client Explanation   
There are two steps to the plausibility check (see Figure 1). Step one relates to 
how well the explanation fits with the unexpected fluctuation. This judgment is a test of 
accounting knowledge (Libby 1985). The auditor need only do a search of his internal 
knowledge base to judge the explanation’s plausibility. It is also unlikely that a client, 
especially a competent client, would present an explanation that violates the accounting 
relationships. Therefore, I use a client-provided explanation that is plausible, given an 
increase in the repair and maintenance account.13 
The second step requires the auditor to confirm that the explanation fits the 
circumstances. The auditor must search for information to confirm or disconfirm the 
client’s explanation. To judge implausibility, the auditor conducts an external information 
search, rather than an internal accounting knowledge search. This search requires 
additional effort. In a situation where in-group bias exists, the auditor could 
                                                 
13 A manipulation check confirmed that the participant has sufficient accounting knowledge to identify the 
explanation as plausible, given the fluctuation.  
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subconsciously choose to forego the additional work and rely instead on his positive 
assessment of the client’s source objectivity.  
In the experimental task, the client explanation is consistent with the direction of 
the unexpected fluctuation, yet inconsistent with certain financial statement information 
(fixed assets have increased). The client explanation provided to participants follows: 
The unexpected increase in repair and maintenance expense 
comes from an internal decision to forego replacing certain 
capital equipment until next year. We were planning to 
replace our fleet of trucks with a new fleet, but due to the 
increase in interest rates, we decided to repair, rather than 
replace them. 
 
3.5 Independent Variables 
3.5.1 Between-subjects treatment: Group Affiliation 
 I manipulate group affiliation at two levels between subjects. Although 
individuals concurrently claim various group affiliations, in this study, I vary only the 
former employment of the client. In-group clients are either former managers or seniors 
from the recurring audit team.14 Out-group clients have worked only for the client firm. I 
expect the manipulation to affect the auditor’s judgment of the client’s objectivity. 
However, since source reliability includes both competence and objectivity, I hold 
competence constant between treatment groups. 
Manipulations occur after this brief introduction. 
                                                 
14 Senior auditors received an explanation from a former audit team manager who became a controller for 
the client. Staff auditors received an explanation from a former audit team senior who became an assistant 
controller for the client. This design maintains one level between the auditor and his or her superior. 
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As part of the current audit fieldwork, your assignment is to 
evaluate the changes in expense accounts. Noticing that the 
current year's repair and maintenance expense account 
balance is unexpectedly high, you have asked Chris, the 
controller, to provide an explanation. 
 
In group Out group 
Chris's Background 
 
Chris's Background 
Chris worked for (your firm) 
for the last several years, 
where he was a manager 
(senior) on the Continental 
Transport audit. 
 
Chris has worked for 
Continental Transport for 
the last several years 
He recently took a job at 
Continental as the controller 
(assistant controller). 
 
He was recently promoted 
to Controller (Assistant 
Controller) at Continental. 
Chris is technically 
proficient in accounting. 
Chris is technically 
proficient in accounting. 
 
3.5.2 Within-subjects treatment: Decision Aid  
 I propose that the decision aid will mitigate in-group bias by modifying the 
presentation of information and providing the auditor search cues. Based on the client’s 
financial statements, the decision aid report lists possible explanations for the unexpected 
account fluctuation. I establish decision aid validity and objectivity as follows. 
The following report was generated by “DecisionSERVE” 
audit software, developed by the (your firm’s) national 
office research department. Auditors should use it to assist 
them in evaluating client explanations. The process uses the 
client’s current and past year’s financial data to generate 
possible explanations for changes in account balances.  
 
Past experience indicates that DecisionSERVE provides 
valid explanations.  
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See Appendix A for an example of the decision aid output and the financial statements. 
3.6 Dependent Variables 
Three dependent variables are measured both pre- and post-decision aid—
plausibility, confidence, and extension of testing.  
3.6.1 Plausibility 
Prior source reliability studies (Bamber 1983; Hirst 1994), used a 100-point scale 
to evaluate participants’ judgments. Bamber (1983) asked participants to evaluate the 
sufficiency of an internal control system. End points were “No Likelihood” and “Certain 
Likelihood.” Hirst (1994) asked participants to provide a probability estimate that 
inventory was materially misstated. On a 100-point scale, endpoints were “there is 
absolutely no chance that Inventory is materially misstated” and “I am absolutely certain 
that Inventory is materially misstated” (p.119). This study uses a 0-100 point scale: end 
points are “not at all plausible” and “highly plausible”. 
3.6.2 Confidence 
 Final audit opinions are the result of combining multiple audit judgments. 
Confidence in each judgment should be sufficient to prevent an audit failure. Bamber et 
al. (1995) reviews research on auditor confidence finding that auditors are overconfident 
in their general knowledge, but underconfident in their performance of financial and audit 
tasks. This underconfidence could be a result of conservatism. I measure confidence on a 
0-100 point scale; end points are “not at all confident” and “completely confident.” 
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3.6.3 Extension of Testing 
The extent of testing variable measures the effect of in-group bias on auditor 
decisions. I inform participants that a normal budget for expense testing for this type of 
client and risk level is 40 hours. The measure allows for the participant to answer “0” if 
they choose not to extend testing. Although staff auditors generally do not make 
decisions to increase testing, they have leeway to investigate items further and/or make 
recommendations to their superiors. Senior auditors do make decisions regarding 
extension of testing therefore this measure mirrors practice. Following prior research 
(Cohen and Kida 1989), I use number of hours budgeted to measure planned increases in 
testing. The scale has end points of 0 hours and 10 hours. 
3.7 Internal and External Validity 
3.7.1 Internal Validity 
 Pedhazur and Schmelkin (1991, 224) define internal validity as “…the validity of 
assertions regarding the effects of the independent variable(s) on the dependent 
variable(s).” In this study, I establish internal validity through a careful research design. 
My goal is to eliminate alternative explanations so that any significant findings related to 
judgments, confidence in those judgments and decisions to extend testing, are, in fact, 
due to either the group manipulation or the use of a decision aid.  Common threats to 
internal validity include history, maturation, testing, instrumentation, regression to the 
mean, selection bias, and mortality (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991).  
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 History threats relate to events that occur during or immediately preceding the 
study, which could influence participants’ responses. In this study, legislation restricting 
auditor hiring by clients was passed one year prior data collection. Since auditors would 
likely be aware of this legislation, they could have been more attuned to the concept of 
in-group bias toward affiliated clients. This awareness could have led participants to 
guess the group hypothesis and as a result, overcompensate for the bias by reducing their 
initial plausibility judgment.  
 Maturation occurs during studies that occur over time – allowing individual 
personal changes to affect outcomes. Participants completed this study in a single sitting 
over less than one hour’s time; therefore, maturation is not a significant threat.  
 The testing threat is applicable when individuals are measured multiple times 
using the same variable (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991). In this study, all three 
dependent variables are measured twice (pre- and post-decision aid). To increase the 
likelihood that individuals would give true responses to the post-decision aid questions, I 
designed the survey so that prior answers were unavailable for viewing (participants 
could not access prior survey pages). This design prevents auditors from merely repeating 
their original answers. Instead, they should have been more likely to incorporate new 
information (from the decision aid) into their second responses.  
 Instrumentation threats arise from differences in the instrument or differences in 
the administration of the instrument. I used the same instrument for all participants, 
however, since data collection occurred online, individual differences in browsers or 
computing speed could have influenced participant responses. For example, although two 
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individuals could have spent the same amount of time completing the survey, the 
individual with a faster online connection speed could have spent more time reading the 
background information and thinking about his answers before responding. The 
participant with a slower online connection would have had to wait longer for the page to 
load, thus shortening the time used to consider responses. Other than an analysis of “time 
to complete” (I verified that no participant took less than 9 minutes or more than 60 
minutes), the only other way to control this threat would have been to administer the 
survey in a computer lab. Given the geographical disparity of participants, this option 
was not feasible.  
 Regression to the mean occurs whenever two variables are not perfectly 
correlated with each other (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991). In this study, the threat of 
regression to the mean is relevant to the second measurements of the dependent variables. 
For example, regression to the mean predicts that auditors who initially rate plausibility 
low (the correct answer), will increase their second plausibility rating toward the mean. 
Likewise, auditors who initially rate plausibility high will decrease their second 
plausibility ratings toward the mean. To test for this effect, I evaluate the direction of 
change for both high and low initial plausibility ratings to assure that they do not assume 
this pattern.  
 Random assignment to treatment groups minimizes the threat of selection bias. 
However, the method of participant recruitment could lead to sample selection bias. I 
recruited auditors by contacting each firm’s national or local office. Partners distributed 
the survey site link through an internal e-mail. Bias could occur from the partners’ 
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selection of employees to send the e-mail to, or could occur from the employees who 
chose to respond to the e-mail. A larger sample size would allow me to confirm that there 
is no difference between early or late responders with respect to demographics and 
dependent variable measures. However, the small sample size prevents a thorough 
analysis of non-response bias.  
 Mortality occurs when individuals do not complete the entire survey. Given that 
this experiment was voluntary, individuals were free to drop at any time. In addition, 
since the survey was online, there was little cost to dropping out (participants would just 
close their browser). Further, mortality in an online context could be unintentional (e.g., 
technology breakdowns, lost Internet connections). During the data collection period, two 
audit firms distributed links to the survey immediately preceding the Thanksgiving 
holiday. The following Monday is referred to as “Black Monday” because of the 
increased online shopping traffic (Kopytoff 2005). Auditors who attempted to logon to 
the Internet could have experienced slower connections due to this phenomenon. This 
could have influenced participants to drop out of the study prior to completion. When I 
became aware of this threat, I contacted the two firms and requested that they send an e-
mail encouraging auditors to return to the survey if they had experienced Internet 
slowdowns. I also designed the survey to allow participants to logon multiple times. This 
allowed participants a chance to complete surveys that were unintentionally interrupted. 
Using demographic analysis and IP address data, I confirmed all responses were from 
different individuals.  
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3.7.2 External Validity 
 External validity is a measure of how well findings can be generalized to or across 
target populations, settings, or time (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991). Participants, task, 
and time are all limitations to external validity. I designed this study and collected data 
from only staff and senior auditors at large, national audit firms. Application of findings 
is limited to this population group. Because managers and partners have longer tenure 
with their firms, as well as more advanced audit skills, generalization to levels above 
senior auditor are inappropriate. In addition, this study makes use of a single audit task, 
analytical procedures. Audit research indicates that task structure and complexity 
influence outcomes and should be adequately considered (Abdolmohammadi and Usoff 
2001). Care should be taken in extending findings to expectations of auditor behavior on 
other audit tasks, especially tasks of different complexity. Finally, as noted before, data 
collection occurred during a time of heightened awareness of possible biases related to 
auditor affiliation. On a larger scale, given several large recent audit failures, audit 
quality was also a concern during data collection. Generalization to future time periods 
may be unsupported and should be approached with caution. 
3.8 Manipulation Checks 
 The post-task questionnaire includes a series of manipulation checks to evaluate 
the strength of the manipulation and rule out alternative explanations. It also contains 
several questions related to prior audit experience and prior experience with clients who 
are former audit firm employees. 
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 The first series of questions measures the participant’s judgment of client 
competence and client and decision aid objectivity. Consistency of competence ratings 
between group treatments rules out the possibility that perceived differences in client 
competence influenced plausibility judgments.  
Following Hirst (1994), I had the participants rate the client’s objectivity (defined 
as …the likelihood that the client would give you, the auditor, a fictitious reason for an 
account fluctuation, when, in fact, he knew that the real reason was different). End points 
are “Extremely low” and “Extremely High”.  
Finally, as in Anderson et al. (2003), participants rated the objectivity of the 
decision aid. To rule out participant non-reliance on the decision aid due to a perception 
of low validity, I also measured the participant’s perception of the decision aid’s validity. 
The second set of questions elicits information about the participant’s past 
experience and general opinions. Participants answered questions about their audit 
experience, experience with clients who were former audit team members, and analytical 
procedures experience. They also rated whether their firm alumnae are more or less 
competent and/or objective than are alumnae of other audit firms, or non-firm 
accountants.  
3.9 Planned Statistical Analyses 
 The first step in data analysis, before hypothesis testing, is to evaluate responses 
for adherence to the manipulation checks. In this study, I am testing for group bias on the 
basis of auditor affiliation. I cannot assume that participants who fail the between-
subjects group manipulation adequately attended to the group affiliation factor; therefore, 
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I plan to exclude those participants from the analysis. I will also evaluate how much time 
each participant spent logged onto the survey. Based on pilot study findings (section 
3.10), participants who spend less than eight minutes likely have not put forth the 
minimum effort to complete the task, therefore, I will eliminate those responses from the 
dataset.  
 I will then analyze the remaining data for violations of the statistical assumptions 
of normality of the dependent variables and constant and equal variance of the residuals 
using visual analysis of the stem and leaf plots and histograms and formal statistical tests 
including the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality. I will use 
Levene’s test for equality of variances. 
 If the data adhere to the required assumptions, I will analyze the dependent 
variables and potential continuous covariates for significant correlations using the 
Pearson correlation coefficient (r). Significant correlations between the dependent 
variables suggest that they must be evaluated simultaneously using multivariate statistics. 
If the dependent variables are significantly correlated, as I expect them to be for the 
repeated measures variables, I will use MANOVA or MANCOVA, as indicated. If the 
dependent variables are not significantly correlated, I will use univariate analysis, 
ANOVA or ANCOVA to test hypotheses.  
 If the data does not adhere to the required assumptions for parametric tests, I will 
analyze the dependent variables and covariates for significant correlations using the 
Spearman rank correlations (rho). I will then test the hypotheses using nonparametric 
tests. I will use the Mann-Whitney, two independent samples test in place of ANOVA. I 
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will use the Friedman Test for K related samples in place of repeated measures 
MANOVA.  
 I will also complete a post hoc analysis to explore interesting or unusual findings 
not formally specified by the hypotheses. 
3.10 Pilot Study 
3.10.1 Pilot Background and Descriptive Statistics  
I conducted a pilot study to gather preliminary data and assess the validity of the 
instrument.15 Participants were undergraduate audit students at a large metropolitan 
university. Since students do not have an in-group affiliation with a particular audit firm, 
I manipulated the group variable by characterizing the client as either a graduate of the 
participant’s university (in-group) or as a graduate of an unnamed university (out-group). 
I also collected additional demographic data relating to grade point average and courses 
taken.  
Twenty-three participants took the survey; I eliminated four because they failed 
the group manipulation check. Of the remaining 19, four took under 8 minutes to 
complete the instrument. Given the length of the instrument, it is unreasonable to believe 
that those participants supplied the requisite effort and I excluded them from the final 
analysis. Of the remaining 15 participants, seven received the in-group treatment and 
eight received the out-group treatment. The mean time to complete was approximately 24 
                                                 
15 Prior to the pilot data collection, two expert auditors previewed the instrument to determine face validity, 
realism, and clarity. Experts indicated that the task and background information was both believable and 
appropriate for novice auditors. I made several small changes to the question text to improve clarity. 
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minutes, average age was 25 years, and mean GPA was 3.3. Gender was fairly even 
within each group. Table 1, Panel A includes descriptive statistics. Panel B of Table 1 
includes dependent variable data by group. 
TABLE 1 – PILOT STUDY  
(All participants n = 15) 
Panel A  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B  
Dependent Variables by Group (mean, standard deviation, range) 
 
 Initial Plausibility 
Initial 
Confidence 
Initial 
Extent 
of 
testing 
Post-decision 
Aid 
Plausibility 
Post-decision 
Aid 
Confidence 
Post-
decision 
Aid Extent 
of testing 
In-
group 
n = 7 
56.43 
(20.56) 
30-90 
62.14 
(17.29) 
40-90 
11.43 
(7.84) 
0-20 
47.14 
(19.12) 
25-80 
67.14 
(20.38) 
40-90 
14.43 
(8.81) 
3-90 
Out-
group 
n = 8 
49.50 
(27.73) 
10-90 
78.75 
(13.29) 
60-100 
10.38 
(6.84) 
0-20 
55.63 
(24.12) 
10-85 
80.63 
(14.25) 
60-100 
8.88 
(5.64) 
0-20 
Overall 
n= 15 
52.73 
(24.05) 
71.00 
(17.03) 
10.87 
(6.91) 
51.67 
(21.60) 
74.33 
(18.11) 
11.47 
(7.58) 
  
Time to Complete  
     Mean 24.08 
     Standard Deviation 8.08 
     Minimum 16 
     Maximum 36 
Gender  
     Male 9 
     Female 6 
Age  
     Mean 24.08 
     Standard Deviation 4.82 
     Minimum 21 
     Maximum 36 
Grade Point Average  
     Mean 3.31 
     Standard Deviation .39 
     Minimum 2.30 
     Maximum 3.80 
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3.10.2 Pilot Study Results 
 The small sample size made analysis of the data for assumptions of normality and 
equal variance problematic. To address this issue, I used nonparametric methods to 
analyze the data. Conover (1999) suggests using the Mann-Whitney, two independent 
samples test, when analyzing data which are not normally distributed. Prior to analysis, I 
analyzed the data for outliers. Noting none, all data were retained within the analysis. 
 Although the raw mean for initial plausibility indicates that in-group auditors rate 
plausibility higher than do out-group auditors, statistical tests show insufficient support 
(p=.310) for hypothesis one. Hypothesis two predicts that auditors will be less confident 
in their judgment when an implausible explanation comes from an in-group member than 
when it comes from an out-group member. Mean confidence measurements support this 
hypothesis as mean in-group confidence (62.14) is lower than mean out-group confidence 
(78.75). Using a Mann-Whitney test, there is a significant difference in confidence 
between groups (p=.035) demonstrating support for hypothesis two.  
 Hypothesis 3 suggests that in-group bias could affect an auditor’s decision to 
extend testing, even though the auditor has correctly identified the explanation as 
implausible. Hypothesis 3 is tested both pre- and post-decision aid. To test this 
hypothesis, responses were split into high (≥50) and low (<50) plausibility groups, 
resulting in 9 high responses and 6 low responses pre-decision aid and 6 high responses 
and 9 low responses post-decision aid. Using the Mann-Whitney test, I found no 
significant support either pre-decision aid (p=.251) or post-decision aid (p=.400) to 
indicate that auditors who correctly identify an explanation as implausible will extend 
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testing less when the explanation is given by an in-group member. Although I found no 
support during the pilot test, recall that the pilot subjects are not auditors, and therefore, 
have little experience in making decisions about extending testing during fieldwork. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that decision aid use will reduce effectively reduce 
plausibility judgments for auditors who have initial incorrect judgments. Conover (1999) 
suggests using the nonparametric Friedman test as a substitute for parametric repeated 
measures analysis when comparing several related samples. Using the Friedman test, 
results indicate that the decision aid did not significantly change auditor judgments 
(p=.353). Hypothesis 5 suggests that confidence will increase post-decision aid. Using 
the Friedman test, there is insufficient evidence to support Hypothesis 5 (p=.125). 
Finally, Hypothesis 6 predicts that auditors who make a correct post-decision aid 
judgment will also increase their decision to extend testing. Although raw mean hours 
increased post-decision aid, there is insufficient evidence to support a significant 
difference between pre-and post-decision aid extent of testing.    
3.10.3 Discussion of Design Changes 
The pilot study was undertaken to provide preliminary data as well as identify 
potential weaknesses in the research design. One caveat is that the group manipulation in 
the pilot study did not exactly replicate the planned group manipulation in the main study 
(university rather than audit firm affiliation).  
Based on the pilot study results, I made several changes to the instrument. Since 
four of the 23 participants (17 percent) could not recall the group manipulation, I made 
the manipulation more salient. I significantly reduced the amount of information given 
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about the client background and presented it in bullet point format. I added an accounting 
knowledge question to confirm the auditors’ internal knowledge about account 
relationships. I included a question about the participant’s experience with affiliated 
clients, and modified a question pertaining to skepticism training. Finally, I simplified the 
decision aid in order to make its content more salient. 
Expert auditors indicated that staff auditors often complete tasks similar to the one 
in the study. However, they also noted that based on the amount of background 
information, several alternative explanations exist for the change in repair and 
maintenance expense. Peecher and Solomon (2001) suggest that internal validity is more 
important than mundane realism. Therefore, I reduced the amount of information in the 
financial statements and firm background to make the task more manageable for the 
participants. This change reduces noise and eliminates alternative explanations for the 
change in account balances. The final instrument can be found in Appendix B. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4.1 Background and Descriptive Statistics 
I collected data over a three-month period using an online survey software 
application.  Participants were staff and senior auditors from five large national firms; all 
were located in the Southeastern United States. Fifty-five auditors answered the survey; 
fifty-three completed all questions. Eleven failed the group manipulation check and three 
failed the accounting knowledge check, leaving forty-one usable responses for the group 
bias hypotheses.16 Table 1 includes the descriptive statistics. Participants included 
twenty-two seniors and nineteen staff auditors. Mean time to complete the survey was 
nineteen minutes, with a minimum of 9.25 and a maximum of 58.18. A frequency 
distribution is included in Figure 5. Average age was about thirty for seniors and twenty-
five for staff members. Mean experience with analytical procedures was twenty-seven 
times (about thirty-nine times for seniors and only six times for staff members). On 
average, senior auditors worked with affiliated clients thirteen percent of the time, staff 
members worked with affiliated clients only about six percent of the time. Table 2 shows 
the number of participants per treatment group. Twenty-four were in-group (client was a 
                                                 
16 The 25 percent failure rate is high and indicates that these individuals did not attend to the manipulation. 
While none of the participants who failed the group treatment manipulation check indicated an incorrect 
client affiliation, all eleven answered that they were unable to tell the client’s prior affiliation given the 
information provided. Given that these participants did not attend to the manipulation, they were dropped 
from the analysis of hypotheses related to group. Inclusion of these eleven does not qualitatively change 
results. The three auditors who failed the accounting knowledge check did not demonstrate sufficient 
knowledge to accurately complete the initial step in plausibility determination. They were also dropped 
form the analysis. 
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former audit firm employee) and seventeen were out-group (client was a long-time 
employee of the client firm).  
FIGURE 5 
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TABLE 2 – PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS FOR GROUP BIAS 
HYPOTHESES TESTS 
(All participants n = 41) 
Panel A- Descriptive Statistics 
 
Seniors 
(n=22) 
Staff 
 (n=19) 
Overall
(n=41)
Time to Complete    
     Mean 17.51 20.28 19.04 
     Standard Deviation 5.31 14.43 10.44 
     Minimum 9.53 9.25 9.25 
     Maximum 30.28 58.18 58.18 
Gender    
     Male 17 10 27 
     Female 5 9 14 
Age    
     Mean 30.59 25.63 28.39 
     Standard Deviation 8.18 4.30 7.00 
     Minimum 24 23 23 
     Maximum 55 41 55 
Analytical Procedures Experience (# of times)    
     Mean 39.41 6.43 26.37 
     Standard Deviation 44.73 10.56 37.12 
     Minimum 2 0 0 
     Maximum 200 40 200 
Experience with Affiliated Clients (% of total clients)    
     Mean 13.41 6.16 9.22 
     Standard Deviation 20.01 13.01 16.87 
     Minimum 0 0 0 
     Maximum 80 50 80 
Certified Public Accountant 18 7 25 
Highest Education Level    
      B.S. Accounting 6 4 10 
      Master of Accounting 14 10 24 
      Master of Business Administration 2 3 5 
      Master - Other 0 2 2 
 
Panel B – NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS IN EACH TREATMENT CONDITION 
Participants per Treatment 
 N Senior Staff 
In-group 22 11 11
Out-group 19 13 6
Total 41 24 17
 58  
4.2 Correlation Matrices 
 A comprehensive statistical analysis requires the evaluation of correlations among 
the dependent variables. If the dependent variables are significantly correlated, a 
multivariate approach is appropriate. Furthermore, significant correlation of potential 
continuous covariates with the dependent variables justifies their inclusion in the 
statistical analysis. I also evaluate correlations between the demographic variables (age, 
gender, level, analytical procedures experience, and affiliated percentage) and the 
dependent variables (plausibility, confidence, and extent of testing). Noting no significant 
correlations, I do not plan to include these demographics variables in the model. 
 Table 3 includes the Spearman rank correlation coefficient matrices (chosen 
because of the non-normality of the data) for the fifty participants who passed the 
accounting knowledge check17. All three post-decision aid dependent variables, 
plausibility, confidence, and extent of testing are significantly positively correlated with 
their respective pre-decision aid variables. This correlation supports the use of the 
Friedman test for repeated measures. Pre-decision aid extension of testing is significantly 
negatively correlated with initial plausibility (rho = -.481). Likewise, post-decision aid 
extension of testing is significantly negatively correlated with post-decision aid 
plausibility. These findings suggest support that lower plausibility judgments lead to 
increased testing, as predicted by Hypothesis 6. 
                                                 
17 Results for the sample excluding the group manipulation check failures are not qualitatively different. 
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4.3 Statistical Analysis 
 Prior to hypothesis testing, I evaluated the data for compliance with the required 
statistical assumptions. Random assignment to groups implies that observations are 
independent for the between-subjects variable, group, but are not independent for the 
within-subjects factor, decision aid. Univariate analysis relies on an assumption of 
normality of the dependent variable (Mendenhall and Sincich 1996). To test for 
univariate normality, I visually analyzed stem and leaf plots and histograms for each 
dependent variable (plausibility, confidence, and extent of testing) across groups. Given 
the small sample size, it was difficult to judge normality from the graphs alone. I also 
analyzed the dependent variables for normality using formal statistical tests: Shapiro-
Wilk and Kolmogorov-Smirnov with Lilliefors significance correction. Table 4 includes 
results. Based on these tests, the dependent variables are not normally distributed. 
However, these tests are highly sensitive to even small departures from normality and are 
therefore of limited use (Mendenhall and Sincich 1996).  
TABLE 4 – TESTS OF NORMALITY FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
   Group Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
    Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Pre-Decision Aid     
Plausibility Out .185 19 .088 .870 19 .015 
  In .172 20 .124 .880 20 .018 
Confidence  Out .286 19 .000 .816 19 .002 
  In .204 20 .028 .820 20 .002 
Extent of Testing Out .223 19 .014 .829 19 .003 
  In .187 20 .066 .860 20 .008 
Post-decision Aid    
Plausibility Out .223 19 .014 .852 19 .007 
  In .232 20 .006 .826 20 .002 
Confidence Out .258 19 .002 .856 19 .008 
  In .222 20 .011 .822 20 .002 
Extent of Testing Out .203 19 .039 .775 19 .001 
  In .207 20 .024 .832 20 .003 
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 To address these concerns, I used the more appropriate nonparametric tests, which 
do not rely on the assumption of normality. For hypotheses that test variables with 
independent observations, I used the Mann-Whitney tests. For hypotheses that test 
repeated measures variables, I used the Friedman test. 
 I evaluated the data for outliers and noted observations with values greater or less 
than two standard deviations from the mean. Three observations for initial confidence fit 
this criterion (all rated confidence at 10), while two observations for extent of testing fit 
this criterion, (rated at 40.00 and 60.00). Removing these observations did not 
qualitatively change results. Given the small sample size and limited justification for 
removal, I retained these observations within the dataset.  
 
4.3.1 In-Group Bias and its Effect on Initial Audit Judgment 
 
 The purpose of this section is to report the findings as to whether in-group bias 
affects auditor plausibility judgments. Prior to testing this hypothesis, I used Mann-
Whitney to confirm that there was no statistically significant difference between groups 
in auditors’ ratings of client competence (p=.200). Thus, I am reasonably assured that 
each group perceived the client equally competent and that differences in plausibility 
judgments are unaffected by differences in client competence judgments. Table 5, Panel 
A displays the plausibility judgment mean, standard deviation, range and number of 
participants by level and treatment group. Participants rated plausibility on a 101-point 
scale where 0 indicates “not at all plausible” and 100 indicates “highly plausible.” I first 
reviewed the plausibility raw means for the total sample, noting that means were in the 
expected direction (in-group 54.50 and out-group 47.84). Using the Mann-Whitney 
nonparametric statistic, I found insufficient support to conclude that groups were 
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significantly different (p=.572 two-tailed). Upon further analysis, I noted that senior 
means were in the expected direction (in-group 56.64 and out-group 35.36), while staff 
means were in the opposite direction. Using Mann-Whitney, I tested the significance for 
seniors only, finding insufficient support (p=.097 one-tailed) to conclude a significant 
difference between groups.   
TABLE 5 – TEST OF IN-GROUP BIAS ON INITIAL PLAUSIBILITY 
JUDGMENT a 
(mean, standard deviation, range, n) 
Panel A- Descriptives 
 
 Senior  
Staff 
  
In-Group 
56.64 
(36.34) 
10-95 
11 
52.36 
(36.35) 
1-100 
11 
54.50 
(35.54) 
22 
Out-Group 
35.36 
(31.96) 
10-89 
11 
65.00 
(23.76) 
25-95 
8 
47.84 
(31.83) 
19 
 
46.00 
(35.12) 
22 
57.68 
(31.54) 
19 
 
a- Plausibility is measured on a 101-point scale where 0 is “not at all plausible” 
and 100 is “highly plausible” 
 
(1) Using Mann-Whitney, one-tailed p-value is insignificant at the .05 level.  
(2) No test is performed as means are in the opposite direction of prediction. 
 
 
 
Panel B – Total Sample 
 
Mann-Whitney Ranks for Total Sample 
 
  Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Plausibility Out-group 19 19.87 377.50 
  In-group 22 21.98 483.50 
  Total 41   
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Test Statistics Plausibility by Group for Total Sample 
 
  Plausibility 
Mann-Whitney U 187.500
Wilcoxon W 377.500
Z -.565
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .572
 
 Panel C – Seniors Only 
Mann-Whitney Ranks for Seniors 
 
 
Ingroup
1 N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
0 11 9.68 106.50 
1 11 13.32 146.50 
Plausibility 
Total 22   
 
Test Statistics by Group for Seniors 
 
 Plausibility 
Mann-Whitney U 40.500 
Wilcoxon W 106.500 
Z -1.338 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) .181 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-
tailed Sig.)] .193 
One tailed Sig. .097 
     
 
4.3.2 In-group Bias and it Effect on Auditor Confidence  
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that participants who received an implausible 
explanation from an in-group client would be less confident in their initial 
judgment than auditors who received an implausible explanation from an out-
group client. Table 6, Panel A displays the mean, standard deviation, range and 
number of participants by level and treatment group for the initial confidence 
variable. Participants indicated their confidence level on a 101-point scale where 
0 indicates “not at all confident” and 100 indicates “completely confident”. Means 
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are in the predicted direction for the total sample (in-group 62.50 and out-group 
71.95), for the seniors (in-group 64.09 and out-group 74.27) and for the staff (in-
group 60.91 and out-group 68.75). Using Mann-Whitney tests, there is 
insufficient evidence to support Hypothesis 2 for the total sample (p=.654), for 
senior auditors (p=.562), or for staff auditors (p=.968).  
TABLE 6 – TEST OF IN-GROUP BIAS ON INITIAL CONFIDENCE a 
(mean, standard deviation, range, n) 
 
Panel A - Descriptives 
 Senior  
Staff 
  
In-Group 
64.09 
(32.24) 
10-95 
11 
60.91 
(32.47) 
15-90 
11 
62.50 
(31.61) 
22 
Out-Group 
74.27 
(30.06) 
10-100 
11 
68.75 
(15.30) 
45-85 
8 
71.95 
(24.51) 
19 
 
69.18 
(30.86) 
22 
64.21 
(26.31) 
19 
 
a – confidence is measured on a 101-point scale where 0 is “not at all confident” and 100 
is “completely confident”. 
 
 
Panel B – Total Sample 
Mann-Whitney Ranks for Total Sample 
 
 Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Out-group 19 21.89 416.00 
In-group 22 20.23 445.00 
Initial 
Confidence  
Total 41   
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Test Statistics by Group for Total Sample 
  
  
Initial 
Confidence
Mann-Whitney U 192.000
Wilcoxon W 445.000
Z -.449
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) .654
Panel C - Seniors 
Mann-Whitney Ranks for Seniors 
 
 Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Out-group 11 12.36 136.00 
In-group 11 10.64 117.00 
Initial 
Confidence  
Total 22   
 
 
Test Statistics by Group for Seniors 
 
 
Initial 
Confidence 
Mann-Whitney U 51.000
Wilcoxon W 117.000
Z -.632
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) .527
Exact Sig. [2*(1-
tailed Sig.)] .562
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D – Staff 
Mann-Whitney Ranks for Staff 
 
 Group N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Out-group 8 9.88 79.00 
In-group 11 10.09 111.00 
Initial 
Confidence  
Total 19   
 
 
 66  
Test Statistics by Group for Staff 
 
 
Confidence 
1 
Mann-Whitney U 43.000
Wilcoxon W 79.000
Z -.083
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) .934
Exact Sig. [2*(1-
tailed Sig.)] .968
 
 
4.3.3 In-group Bias and it Effect on Auditor Decisions to Extend Testing 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that in-group bias persists in an auditor’s decision to extend 
testing, even when the auditor correctly identifies the explanation as implausible. For this 
test, I used a subset of “low plausibility” auditors to represent auditors who are correct. In 
lieu of a normative answer, I considered auditors who rated plausibility less than 50 % to 
be correct. Table 7, Panel A displays the mean, standard deviation, and range for the 
dependent variable extent of testing. Panel A also includes the number of participants by 
level and treatment group. The extent of testing measurement represents the number of 
hours participants chose to extend analytical procedures testing. Participants selected this 
amount after making plausibility and confidence judgments. Using a Mann-Whitney test, 
I evaluated this hypothesis both pre and post-decision aid. As noted in section 4.2, 
plausibility rating is significantly correlated with the dependent variable of interest 
“decision to extend testing” both pre- and post-decision aid. Partitioning the sample to 
include only “correct” responses should sufficiently address this correlation. Initial extent 
of testing is significantly correlated (rho = .881) with post-decision aid extent of testing, 
but cannot be accommodated by nonparametric procedures. An analysis of the raw means 
for each group indicates that extent of testing is in the opposite direction from predicted 
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for both pre-decision aid (in-group 14.89 and out-group 11.11) and post-decision aid (in-
group 17.44 and out-group 12.44). Given the raw means for auditors who correctly assess 
an explanation, a statistical test is unjustified. There is insufficient evidence that group 
affiliation impacts the auditor’s decision to extend testing either pre- or post-decision aid. 
A post hoc analysis in section 4.4 further investigates this finding. 
 
TABLE 7– TEST OF IN-GROUP BIAS ON DECISION TO EXTEND TESTING: 
CORRECT JUDGMENTS ONLY  
(mean, standard deviation, range, n) 
 
 Pre-decision Aid  
Post -decision Aid 
 
In-Group  
Extent of Testing 
14.89 
(11.67) 
2-40 
9 
17.44 
(13.99) 
4-40 
9 
Out-Group 
Extent of Testing 
11.11 
(9.33) 
0-20 
9 
12.44 
(8.05) 
0-20 
9 
 
4.3.4 Discussion of Analysis of Decision Aid Hypotheses  
  
 As noted in section 4.1, eleven participants failed to answer the group 
manipulation check correctly. Given that I found insufficient support to indicate the 
presence of in-group bias (and there is no reason to believe that group bias affects 
decision aid effectiveness), there is no justification to exclude the participants who failed 
the manipulation check from the analysis. I test the decision aid hypotheses using the 
complete sample18. Table 8 includes descriptive statistics for the sample including 
manipulation check failures. 
 
                                                 
18 Note that two of the additional participants failed to indicate post-decision plausibility, confidence, and 
extent of testing, resulting in a final sample of 50. 
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TABLE 8– PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS FOR DECISION AID 
HYPOTHESES TESTS 
(All participants n = 50) 
 
    
 
Seniors 
(n=26) 
Staff 
 (n=24) 
Overall
(n=50)
Time to Complete    
     Mean 19.27 18.17 18.53 
     Standard Deviation 12.49 12.49 11.14 
     Minimum 9.53 9.25 9.25 
     Maximum 45.36 58.18 58.18 
Gender    
     Male 21 14 35 
     Female 5 10 15 
Age    
     Mean 31.04 26.08 28.66 
     Standard Deviation 8.59 4.39 7.28 
     Minimum 24 23 23 
     Maximum 55 41 55 
Analytical Procedures Experience (# of times)    
     Mean 38.12 5.72 25.87 
     Standard Deviation 44.67 10.75 39.91 
     Minimum 2 0 0 
     Maximum 200 40 200 
Experience with Affiliated Clients (% of total clients)    
     Mean 13.48 7.71 10.65 
     Standard Deviation 18.56 16.77 17.92 
     Minimum 0 0 0 
     Maximum 80 75 80 
Certified Public Accountant 22 8 30 
Highest Education Level    
      B.S. Accounting 8 4 12 
      Master of Accounting 15 14 29 
      Master of Business Administration 3 4 7 
      Master - Other 0 2 2 
 
 
4.3.5 Decision Aid Use and its Effect on Auditor Plausibility Judgments 
 
Hypothesis 4 tests for the effectiveness of a decision aid on improving plausibility 
judgments for auditors who were initially incorrect. In this study, a reduction in 
plausibility rating represents an improvement in judgment (since the explanation given is 
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implausible). I partition the total sample by initial plausibility judgments considering 
judgments greater than or equal to 50% as incorrect. As shown in Table 9, Panel A, 
overall, plausibility judgments decreased after use of the decision aid (initial plausibility 
mean 75.77 and post-decision aid plausibility mean 49.76). The appropriate 
nonparametric test for related samples is the Friedman test (Conover 1999). Results for 
the Friedman test for the total sample (Table 9, Panel B) find support for the effectiveness 
of the decision aid to improve plausibility judgments (p=.000). Hypothesis 4 is supported. 
Additional analysis finds that hypothesis 4 is also supported for seniors (Table 7, Panel 
C) (p=.008) and for staff (Table 9, Panel D) (p=.001).  
TABLE 9– EFFECT OF DECISION AID ON AUDITOR PLAUSIBILITY 
JUDGMENTS (Incorrect auditors only) 
(mean, standard deviation, range, n) 
 
Panel A – Descriptives 
 
 Seniors Staff  
Pre-decision Aid 
Plausibility 
80.33 
(14.00) 
50-95 
12 
72.89 
(16.36) 
50-100 
19 
75.77 
(15.68) 
31 
Post-decision Aid 
Plausibility 
55.73 
(34.65) 
0-95 
11 
46.11 
(32.34) 
0-100 
18 
49.76 
(32.96) 
29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B – Total Sample   
Friedman Ranks for Total Sample 
 
  Mean Rank 
Pre-decision Aid Plausibility 1.84 
Post-decision Aid Plausibility 1.16 
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Test Statistics for Change in Plausibility for Total Sample 
 
N 29
Chi-Square 18.182
df 1
Asymp. Sig. .000
 
Panel C –Seniors 
Friedman Ranks for Seniors 
 
 Mean Rank 
Pre-decision Aid Plausibility 1.82 
Post-decision Aid Plausibility 1.18 
 
 
Test Statistics for Change in Plausibility for Seniors 
 
N 11
Chi-Square 7.000
df 1
Asymp. Sig. .008
 
 
 
Panel D – Staff 
Friedman Ranks for Staff 
 
 Mean Rank 
Pre-decision Aid Plausibility 1.86 
Post-decision Aid Plausibility 1.14 
 
Test Statistics for Change in Plausibility for Staff 
 
N 18
Chi-Square 11.267
df 1
Asymp. Sig. .001
 
 
 
Section 4.3.6 Effect of Decision Aid on Confidence 
   
Hypothesis 5 predicts that auditor confidence will increase post decision aid. I 
measured confidence on a 101-point scale where 0 is “not at all confident” and 100 is 
“completely confident.” Table 10 includes the mean, standard deviation, range and 
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number of observations. Pre-decision aid confidence ratings ranged from 10 to 100, with 
a mean of 68.79 (standard deviation 27.96). Post-decision aid confidence ratings ranged 
from 0-100 with a mean of 65.74 (standard deviation 32.72). Contrary to expectations, 
raw mean confidence scores decreased for both seniors and staff members; thus 
Hypothesis 5 is not supported. Section 4.4 contains a post hoc analysis that explores the 
changes in confidence. 
TABLE 10–CHANGE IN CONFIDENCE POST-DECISION AID  
(mean, standard deviation, range, n) 
Descriptives 
 
  Seniors Staff  
Pre-decision Aid 
Confidence 
69.70 
(30.99) 
10-100 
27 
67.80 
(24.88) 
15-95 
25 
68.79 
(27.96) 
52 
Post-decision Aid 
Confidence 
66.92 
(35.28) 
0-100 
26 
64.46 
(24.88) 
0-100 
24 
65.74 
(32.72) 
50 
 
 
Section 4.3.7 Effect of Decision Aid on Extent of Testing 
 
As noted, it is insufficient to examine auditor judgments alone, as auditor 
decisions ultimately impact audit effectiveness. This test explores whether auditors will 
improve their decisions after using a decision aid. Hypothesis 6 predicts that auditors who 
initially make an incorrect judgment, will increase their extent of testing after using a 
decision aid. In keeping with prior procedures, I restrict my analysis to auditors who 
initially provided an incorrect judgment (plausibility judgment greater than or equal to 
50%). Table 11, Panel A includes the mean, standard deviation, and range for the 
dependent variable extent of testing both pre- and post-decision aid. After having access 
to the decision aid, participants increased testing by 61 %, from 6.34 hours to 10.21 
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hours. Using the Friedman test, which is the appropriate nonparametric statistic for a 
repeated measures analysis, this increase in the extent of testing is significantly greater 
post-decision aid for the total sample (p=.000). Additional analysis shows that 
Hypothesis 6 is also supported for staff auditors (p=.001), but not for senior auditors 
(p=.083). Section 4.4 includes a post hoc analysis of changes in extent of testing for 
auditors who are initially correct. 
TABLE 11 – TEST OF EFFECT OF DECISION AID ON EXTENT OF TESTING 
(INITIALLY INCORRECT AUDITORS ONLY) 
(mean, standard deviation, range, n) 
 
Panel A – Descriptives 
 
 Seniors Staff  
Pre-decision aid 
Extent of Testing 
5.00 
(5.79) 
0-16 
11 
7.17 
(8.38) 
0-30 
18 
6.34 
(7.28) 
29 
Post-decision aid  
Extent of Testing 
6.27 
(5.06) 
0-16 
11 
12.61 
(14.86) 
0-60 
18 
10.21 
(12.37) 
29 
 
 
 
Panel B – Total Sample 
Friedman Ranks for Total Sample 
 
  Mean Rank 
Pre-decision Aid Extent of Testing 1.26 
Post-decision Aid Extent of Testing 1.74 
 
Test Statistics for Change in Extent of Testing for Total Sample 
 
N 29
Chi-Square 14.000
df 1
Asymp. Sig. .000
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Panel C – Seniors 
Friedman Ranks for Seniors 
 
  Mean Rank 
Pre-decision Aid Extent of Testing 1.36 
Post-decision Aid Extent of Testing 1.64 
 
Test Statistics for Change in Extent of Testing for Seniors 
 
N 11
Chi-Square 3.000
df 1
Asymp. Sig. .083
Panel D – Staff 
Friedman Ranks for Staff 
  Mean Rank 
Pre-decision Aid Extent of Testing 1.19 
Post-decision Aid Extent of Testing 1.81 
 
Test Statistics for Change in Extent of Testing for Staff 
 
N 18
Chi-Square 11.000
df 1
Asymp. Sig. .001
 
4.4 Post Hoc Analysis  
 I perform the following post hoc analyses to investigate prior nonsignificant 
findings and to explore relevant relationships.  
 Hypothesis 3 suggested that in-group bias could cause auditors who correctly 
identified a client explanation as implausible to curtail additional testing. I found no 
support to indicate that group bias affects decisions to extend testing. However, it is 
important to confirm that auditors who correctly identified a client explanation as 
implausible did, in fact, increase testing (independent of group). I conducted the 
following Mann-Whitney nonparametric test to confirm that auditors who judged the 
client explanation as implausible increased testing more than auditors who judged the 
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client explanation as plausible. Table 12 includes the ranks and test statistics. Findings 
suggest that auditors acted as expected and that decisions to extend testing logically 
followed judgments (p=.008).  
 TABLE 12 POST HOC ANALYSIS OF EXTENT OF TESTING 
Mann-Whitney Ranks for Total Sample 
 
 
Initial 
Plausibility N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Correct 21 33.21 697.50 
Incorrect 31 21.95 680.50 
Initial Extent 
of Testing  
Total 52   
 
Test Statistics by Group for Total Sample 
 
 
Initial 
Extent of 
Testing  
Mann-Whitney U 184.500
Wilcoxon W 680.500
Z -2.653
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) .008
  
 Hypothesis 5 proposed that confidence would increase post-decision aid for all 
auditors. A post hoc analysis analyzed the changes in confidence by initial plausibility, 
separating auditor into groups of initially correct and initially incorrect. Table 13, Panel 
A includes descriptive statistics. Table 13, Panel B reports the Friedman test statistics for 
pre- and post-decision aid confidence for auditors who were initially correct.  Confidence 
significantly increased post-decision aid (p=.005). This result is logical because the 
decision aid provided confirming evidence. It also partially supports Hypothesis 5. Table 
13, Panel C reports Friedman test statistics for pre- and post-decision aid confidence for 
auditors who were initially incorrect. While raw means indicate that confidence 
decreased post-decision aid, this decrease was not significant (p=.127). 
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TABLE 13 - POST HOC ANALYSIS OF CONFIDENCE BY INITIAL 
 JUDGMENT 
(mean, standard deviation, range, n) 
 
Panel A 
 Initially Correct  
Initially Incorrect 
 
Pre-decision aid 
Confidence 
64.52 
(35.03) 
10-100 
21 
72.66 
(21.33) 
10-95 
29 
Post-decision aid 
Confidence 
71.57 
(33.36) 
10-100 
21 
61.52 
(32.16) 
0-100 
29 
 
  
 
Panel B 
 
Friedman Ranks for Initially Correct Auditors 
 
 
Mean 
Rank 
Pre-decision aid 
Confidence 1.31 
Post-decision aid 
Confidence 1.69 
 
 
 
Test Statistics for Initially Correct Auditors 
 
N 21
Chi-Square 8.000
df 1
Asymp. Sig. .005
 
Panel C 
Friedman Ranks for Initially Incorrect Auditors 
 
  
Mean 
Rank 
Pre-decision aid 
Confidence 1.62 
Post-decision aid 
Confidence 1.38 
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Test Statistics for Initially Incorrect Auditors 
 
N 29
Chi-Square 2.333
df 1
Asymp. Sig. .127
 
 
 Hypothesis 6 examines whether decision aid use improves decisions for auditors 
who are initially incorrect. I performed additional testing to confirm that auditors who are 
initially correct also increase testing post-decision aid. Table 14, Panel A provides 
descriptive statistics of pre- and post-decision aid extent of testing for initially correct 
auditors. Table 14, Panel B shows test results. There is significant support (p=.014) that 
initially correct auditors also increased testing post-decision aid. 
TABLE 14 - POST HOC ANALYSIS OF EXTENT OF TESTING FOR 
INITIALLY CORRECT AUDITORS 
(mean, standard deviation, range, n) 
Panel A 
  
Pre-decision aid 
Extent of Testing 
13.29 
(10.05) 
0-40 
21 
Post-decision aid 
Extent of Testing 
15.57 
(11.01) 
0-40 
21 
Panel B 
 
 
Friedman Ranks for Initially Correct Auditors 
 
  Mean Rank 
Pre-decision aid 
Extent of Testing 1.36 
Post-decision aid 
Extent of Testing 1.64 
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Test Statistics for Initially Correct Auditors 
 
N 21
Chi-Square 6.000
df 1
Asymp. Sig. .014
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1 Discussion of Results 
Table 15 includes a summary of findings. I found no support for an in-group bias 
effect on auditor plausibility judgments, confidence in those judgments or decisions to 
extend testing. I found strong support for the effect of a decision aid on improvements in 
auditor plausibility judgments and decisions to extend testing. I found no support for an 
increase in confidence post-decision aid. I follow with a discussion of findings and 
possible reasons for lack of significant findings. 
TABLE 15 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Hypothesis IV DV Supported p-value 
1 Group Plausibility No .572 
2 Group Confidence No .654 
3 (pre-decision 
aid) Group 
Extent of 
Testing No --- 
3 (post-decision 
aid) Group 
Extent of 
Testing No --- 
4 Decision Aid Plausibility Yes .000 
5 Decision Aid Confidence No --- 
6 Decision Aid Extent of Testing Yes .000 
 
Legislation that restricts client hiring of former external auditors provides 
evidence that there is a belief that in-group bias exists and that it affects auditor 
independence. Although theory suggests that individuals demonstrate in-group bias in the 
form of extending unjustified trust to their group members, auditors may or may not 
exhibit this bias in an audit context. I employ an experiment to investigate potential 
differences in auditor judgments based on the client’s former employment with the audit 
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firm. Hypothesis 1 predicted that auditors would judge an explanation from an in-group 
client as more plausible than an explanation from an out-group client.  
I partitioned the sample into seniors and staff to analyze the data in more detail. 
An analysis of raw means for seniors indicated that plausibility judgments were, in fact, 
higher for the in-group treatment, (56.64 versus 35.36); however, the difference was not 
statistically significant. Raw means for staff auditors’ plausibility judgments are in the 
opposite direction with out-group plausibility judgments higher than in-group plausibility 
judgments (65.00 versus 52.36); again, the difference is not statistically significant. The 
raw means do suggest that seniors are more likely to exhibit in-group bias than are staff 
auditors. Seniors could be more likely to exhibit in-group bias because they likely have 
been a part of the audit firm group for a longer period of time than have staff auditors. In 
addition, staff auditors are likely recent graduates of accounting programs. These 
programs typically cover professional standards, which emphasize professional 
skepticism. The emphasis on skepticism could cause staff auditors to pay close attention 
to client source reliability, thus mitigating in-group bias. Although the current study 
found insufficient evidence to support an effect of in-group bias on auditor plausibility 
judgments in an analytical procedures task, increasing the sample size of senior auditors 
only might shed light on the prevalence of in-group bias.  
While theory supports finding a difference, there are several possible reasons why 
I did not find a significant difference. These include lack of power, experimental 
weaknesses, or absence of a difference in fact. First, I had access to a limited sample of 
auditors, which resulted in a small pool of participants. To rectify this situation, I plan to 
collect additional data. Second, several participants failed the manipulation check and 
were removed from the analysis. A failed manipulation check is often the result of an 
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experimental weakness. I plan to improve the study by making the client affiliation 
manipulation more salient, perhaps by including detailed information about the 
controller’s background, particularly his or her experience at the audit (client) firm. 
Finally, it may be that auditors do not exhibit in-group bias when performing audit 
procedures. Both extensive training and attention to professional skepticism act against 
an individual’s inclination to exhibit in-group bias and could mitigate this bias. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted an effect of in-group bias on confidence such that auditors 
who received an implausible explanation from an in-group client would be less confident 
in their plausibility judgments than an auditor who received the same explanation from an 
out-group client. Although there is insufficient evidence to support a statistical difference 
between groups, the raw means are in a direction consistent with Hypothesis 2. In-group 
seniors have a mean confidence level of 64.09, while out-group seniors demonstrate a 
higher mean confidence of 74.27. The same relationship holds for staff members’ mean 
confidence: in-group, 60.91 and out-group, 68.75. Prior research has indicated that 
factors such as experience and gender could moderate confidence. Although I collected 
data regarding participants’ analytical procedures experience and gender demographics, 
the use of nonparametric statistics prevented their inclusion in the analysis, since there is 
no nonparametric procedure that allows for the inclusion of covariates. A larger sample 
size could allow the use of parametric statistics, which, in turn, accommodate models that 
are more powerful and allow for the inclusion of covariates. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that in-group bias would affect an auditor’s decision to 
extend testing such that even though the auditor had made a correct plausibility judgment, 
he or she would extend testing less if the client was a former audit team member. In other 
words, even though an auditor “knows” that a client is providing an implausible 
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explanation, he or she could still choose to “overlook” the inconsistency of the 
explanation because the client is a former auditor from his or her firm. I tested for this 
effect both pre- and post-decision aid. I examined the means and found that pre-decision 
aid, in-group auditors extended testing by 14.89 hours, while out-group auditors extended 
testing an average of 11.11 hours. Likewise, post-decision aid measures show that in-
group auditors extended testing by 17.44 hours, while out-group members extended 
testing by only 12.44 hours. Although there is no evidence of a group effect, in a post hoc 
analysis, I analyzed extent of testing to confirm that an auditor who makes a correct 
initial plausibility judgment extends testing more than an auditor who makes an incorrect 
initial plausibility judgment. I find significant support that auditors do, in fact, extend 
testing more when they are correct than when they are incorrect. This finding indicates 
that participants expended the requisite cognitive effort to the task. Thus, results likely 
indicate that there is no in-group bias in auditors’ decisions to extend testing in an 
analytical procedures task. 
 In addition to testing for group biases, I also examined whether a simple decision 
aid could improve auditors’ plausibility judgments, confidence in those judgments, and 
decisions. Hypothesis 4 predicted that auditors who provided initially incorrect (high 
plausibility) judgments, would decrease those judgments after using a decision aid. 
Nonparametric statistical analyses provided evidence that decision aids improved 
auditors’ plausibility judgments in an analytical procedures task. This effect was 
supported for the total sample and for staff and senior auditors independently. Seniors 
significantly reduced their plausibility judgments from 80.33 to 55.73, while staff 
auditors significantly reduced their plausibility judgments from 72.89to 46.11. These 
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findings justify the effectiveness of a simple decision aid in improving auditors’ 
performance during analytical procedures.  
Prior literature indicates confidence improves as individuals gather more 
information. Hypothesis 5 predicted that auditors would increase their confidence after 
using a decision aid. A review of the raw means indicated that confidence decreased 
overall for both seniors (69.70 to 66.92) and staff members (67.80 to 64.46). I explored 
the change in confidence further in a post hoc analysis. Confirmation bias suggests that 
individuals tend to disregard disconfirming evidence and overweight confirming 
evidence. Although I found no prior literature indicating that this effect is associated with 
changes in confidence, I chose to partition the sample by initial plausibility judgment to 
explore this variable further. I found that for auditors who were initially correct (low 
plausibility), confidence significantly increased after using a decision aid. The decision 
aid’s confirmation of their original judgment likely is responsible for their increased 
confidence. However, confidence for auditors who were initially incorrect showed a 
marginally significant decrease. This decreased confidence is possibly a result of the 
disconfirming evidence provided to those auditors by the decision aid. Although initially 
incorrect auditors improved their plausibility judgment post-decision aid (indicating 
reliance on the decision aid), they would logically have felt less confident about their 
own ability to audit. It is possible that when they answered the confidence question, they 
were indicating confidence in their ability, rather than confidence in that particular 
judgment. 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that the use of a decision aid would improve auditors’ 
decisions to extend testing. As I did before in the tests for Hypothesis 4 (effect of 
decision aid on plausibility judgments); I partitioned the sample, choosing only auditors 
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who were initially incorrect (high plausibility).  I found that those auditors significantly 
increased the extent of testing after using a decision aid. This finding supports the 
effectiveness of a decision aid on auditor decisions to extend testing in an analytical 
procedures task. I also analyzed the participants by level. While senior auditors increased 
their extent of testing from a mean of 5.00 to 6.27, (the correct direction but a statistically 
insignificant difference), staff auditors increased their extent of testing from 7.17 to 
12.61, (a statistically significant difference). Although only staff auditors increased 
testing significantly, seniors also increased testing. These findings support the hypothesis 
that decision aids improve decisions to extend testing. 
A post hoc analysis explores the effect of a decision aid on extent of testing for 
initially correct (low plausibility) auditors. Raw means for extent of testing increased 
from 13.29 pre-decision aid to 15.57 post-decision aid. This increase was statistically 
significant, demonstrating that decision aids are effective in improving auditor decisions 
for both initially correct and initially incorrect auditors.  
5.2 Summary 
 
This study had two objectives: first, to investigate whether in-group bias was 
evident in auditors’ judgments, confidence in those judgments, and decisions and second, 
to examine whether a decision aid was effective in improving auditors’ judgments, 
confidence in those judgments, and decisions. Auditors completed an online task in 
which they evaluated client explanations for changes in an account balance. The client 
source’s affiliation differed between participants – in-group clients were former members 
of the participant’s audit firm, out-group members were long-time client employees. 
Based on Social Identity Theory, I predicted that auditors would exhibit in-group bias in 
their judgments and decisions, assigning a higher level of plausibility to explanations 
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obtained from a former group member, and reducing testing for in-group client audits. I 
found no effect for in-group bias on judgment, confidence in judgment, or extent of 
testing. 
After collecting auditors’ initial plausibility judgments, confidence ratings, and 
decisions, I presented them with a decision aid report. I expected the structured design of 
the report to improve audit plausibility judgments, confidence in those judgments, and 
decisions to extend testing. The decision aid improved plausibility judgments for both 
staff and senior auditors, and for both initially incorrect and initially correct auditors. The 
decision aid also increased confidence for auditors who made initially correct judgments, 
but not for auditors who were initially incorrect. For auditors who were initially incorrect, 
there was a marginally significant reduction in confidence. Although decision aid use did 
not result in increased confidence for all auditors, the decision aid resulted in improved 
plausibility judgments and decisions to extend testing. Practitioners should note the 
positive effects of providing a decision aid during analytical review. 
Professional skepticism is necessary to audit effectively; however, auditors are 
subject to human biases. An auditor’s failure to adjust appropriately his or her assessment 
of client objectivity may compromise independence and audit effectiveness. Audit firms 
should be aware of the potential for this bias, so that they can reduce the risk of audit 
failure. Congress and the AICPA already have noted that the hiring of former audit team 
members could lead to an impairment of independence and objectivity. This study sought 
to improve the understanding of both the existence and extent of this claim. However, 
due to the small sample size, results about in-group bias are inconclusive. Additional data 
collection could provide results that are more conclusive. 
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A simple decision aid was effective in improving judgments overall. Both seniors 
and staff members improved their judgments, as well as their decisions post-decision aid. 
The decision aid also improved judgments and decisions not only for auditors who were 
initially incorrect, but also for auditors who initially rated plausibility low. An added 
benefit is that the decision aid increased confidence for auditors who were initially 
correct. This increase in confidence possibly stems from the positive feedback offered by 
the decision aid. The decision aid used in this study was a simple listing of account 
relationships and expectations related to those relationships. The decision aid provided 
valid, reasonable advice to auditors during the task. Audit firms could find the use of 
simple decision aids a low-cost way to improve auditor performance. 
5.3 Limitations 
5.3.1 Small Sample Size 
 Pedhazur and Schmelkin (1991) list four elements to consider when using a 
decision-based strategy for hypothesis testing.19 These elements are effect size, Type I 
error, Type II error and sample size. In this study, effect size refers to the magnitude of 
the difference between groups (and between pre- and post-decision aid) for the dependent 
variables plausibility, confidence, and extent of testing. A Type I error (designated by α) 
is the error of rejecting the null, when it should not have been rejected (Pedhazur and 
Schmelkin 1991). In this case, a Type I error would be to conclude that there is an in-
group bias, when there is not actually an in-group bias. A Type II error (designated by β) 
is the error of failing to reject the null hypothesis, when, in fact, it should be rejected. 
                                                 
19 A decision-based strategy refers to using a pre-determined value for hypothesis testing. For example, 
when comparing two groups, setting an α (alpha) value to determine rejection of the null. 
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This is also known as the power to detect a difference, should one exist. An example in 
this study would be finding no significant group bias, when, in fact, there is a significant 
group bias. Sample size, the fourth element, inter-relates with effect size, and both Type I 
and Type II errors, such that increases in sample size, increase power, while decreases in 
sample size decrease power (holding effect size constant). In this study, the sample size 
was small, which made determination of normality of the data problematic. Without the 
ability to confirm that the data was normal, I chose to use nonparametric statistical 
methods (which do not rely on normality). Nonparametric methods are more likely to 
result in a Type II error (less likely to detect differences). Given that I designed the study 
with careful attention to internal validity, I estimate that my failure to detect group bias is 
a result of either small sample size or small (no) bias effects in fact. While there is 
insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis (of no group bias), based on the data 
collected, I likewise cannot conclude that in-group bias does not exist for auditors. By 
increasing sample size in the future, I hope to arrive at results that are more conclusive. 
5.3.2 Alternative Explanations 
There are a number of limitations to consider in interpreting the results of the 
current study.  Given the heightened awareness of threats to independence resulting from 
auditor affiliation, participants could have engaged in hypothesis guessing. Demand 
effects from hypothesis guessing typically result in participants trying to “give the 
researcher what he or she wants.” In this study, participants could have wanted to appear 
in the best light possible, answering in such a way as to obscure their inclination toward 
in-group bias. 
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 Limitations to the findings of a reduction in plausibility post decision-aid could 
be due to a recency effect, rather than a mitigation of in-group bias. Recency argues that 
auditors overweight information received later in a sequence.20 In this study, since 
auditors receive the decision aid report last, they could have placed more weight on its 
recommendation. Both Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) and Ashton and Ashton (1988) find 
recency effects for a series of conflicting evidence. However, the tasks used in those 
studies were not analytical procedures tasks. Asare and Messier (1991) note that in an 
unpublished study, Bonner and Butler (1989) did not find recency effects in an analytical 
procedures task. Confirmation bias (Church 1990) could also mitigate the effectiveness of 
the decision aid. Confirmation bias exists when individuals tend to overweight evidence 
that supports their initial beliefs. Auditors who initially believe the client could be more 
likely to disregard the decision aid report, resulting in a non-significant finding. 
However, Smith and Kida (1991) find that auditor’s conservatism precludes the use of 
confirmatory strategies. Since participants are practicing auditors, confirmation bias is 
unlikely.  
5.3.3 Experimental Context 
The experimental context is also a limitation. The sterility of an online experiment 
cannot capture the face-to-face interactions present in an actual audit. When faced with 
individuals that they know personally and with whom they have a working relationship 
and history, auditors may subconsciously make different judgments than they would in an 
experimental setting. In-group bias in an audit context might be more subtle and difficult 
to recreate in an experimental setting. This study is also limited to positive prior 
                                                 
20 Asare and Messier (1991) provide an in-depth summary of belief adjustment audit research.  
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relationships between the parties. Circumstances in which the past relationship is 
negative could result in different findings. 
The online method of data collection has limitations as well. The researcher 
cannot observe participants as they proceed through the survey; this lack of supervision 
reduces experimental control. Participants can engage in multiple tasks (e.g., surfing the 
web, talking on the phone, answering e-mails) while completing the online survey. 
Participants can also leave the computer and return later leaving the researcher to guess 
whether the extra time spent online was, in fact, representative of added effort or lack of 
effort. In this particular study, an additional limitation arose from the recruiting method. 
The researcher had no control over which auditors at a firm took the survey. Therefore, 
selection bias could have been a factor in the results. Auditors who took the survey could 
have been the “less capable” auditors with more free time. On the other hand, partners 
could have selected the “more capable” auditors to answer the survey in order to present 
their firm in the best light.  
5.4 Future Research 
 There are several avenues for future research including addressing research 
design weaknesses, using alternative research methods, extending research parameters, 
and altering the decision aid. As noted above, the research design was limited. Recency 
provides an alternative explanation to findings of decision aid effectiveness. Prior 
research suggests a recency effect for mixed evidence in a content-rich audit setting 
(Tubbs et al. 1990). This issue could be addressed by including a group that receives the 
decision aid concurrently with the client explanation and comparing that group with pre-
decision aid judgments. A large number of participants (11 out of 55 or 20%) failed the 
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between-subjects group affiliation manipulation check. While the removal of these 
observations is justified, the smaller sample size reduced the power of the study. Future 
trials can be modified to make the group manipulation more salient. Alternatively, 
researchers can require participants to respond to a set of questions that ensures they are 
aware of the manipulation before proceeding with the experiment.  
Another avenue for future research is to use an alternative research method. Given 
that in-group bias appears sensitive to face-to-face cues, an experiment that uses actual 
firm auditors interacting with participants could improve results. An archival approach 
using working papers for completed audits would provide a richer data set. By analyzing 
auditors’ work, I could explore whether auditor judgments and decisions differ based on 
the presence/absence of an affiliated client.  
A natural and relevant extension of this research is to vary the participants of 
interest. Archival studies including Lennox (2005) and Menon and Williams (2004) find 
evidence of affiliation bias at the partner level. Based on the current study, there is some 
evidence that seniors exhibit bias, while staff members do not. Using managers and 
partners in an experimental study could reveal stronger biases. Another extension would 
explore affiliation at various levels; for example, does affiliation (in-group bias) occur 
between members of the same office, the same firm, or even between Big Four group 
members? In addition, does in-group bias depend on the audit task? This study used a 
single task, analytical procedures related to expense accounts, often completed by a lower 
level employee. Given the multitude of tasks completed during an audit, it would be 
worthwhile to explore tasks that have a larger impact on the final audit opinion (e.g., 
evaluation of a going concern). As a final point, given the effectiveness of the decision 
aid report, future research should investigate the development and effectiveness of 
 90  
decision aids in audit practice. Eining et al. (1997) find that constructive dialogue, a form 
of interaction between participants and the decision aid, auditor performance. The 
decision aid in this study could be modified to include an interactive component. The 
current study found that staff auditors relied heavily on their plausibility judgments in 
making the decision to extend testing. Given the link between judgments and decision-
making, it is worthwhile to study how decision aids can improve audit practice. 
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Appendix A 
Background Material21 and DecisionSERVE Report 
 
Client Background 
 
Continental Transport Inc. is one of North America's largest logistics companies, with 
operations in the United States, Canada, Mexico, South America, Europe, and Asia. Most 
of their revenue comes from providing truck, rail, ocean, and air transportation 
throughout the world.  
 
Continental Transport Inc. works with Fortune 500/Blue Chip companies and family-
owned and start-up businesses. They develop logistics plans and provide the people, 
transportation, and execution to make the plans work. Their 2,000+ motor carriers 
provide flatbed, temperature controlled, expedited, and special handling services. They 
are publicly owned and traded on the NASDAQ. They have 27 offices and 750 
employees. 
 
Continental Transport, Inc. 
Income Statement 
FYE 12/31/05, 12/31/04  
(unaudited) 
(in thousands) 
12/31/2004 12/31/2003 
Actual 
Change 
Percent 
Change 
Revenue:         
Transportation 
Revenue 284,593 251,721 32,872 13.06% 
Cost of 
Transportation:         
Fuel and 
Depreciation 238,123 210,590 27,533 13.07% 
Repair and 
Maintenance 6,532 3,862 2,670 69.14% 
Total Cost: 244,655 214,452 30,203 14.08% 
Gross Profit 39,938 37,269 2,669 7.06% 
Total selling, 
general, and 
administrative 
expenses 
24,470 24,203 267 1.10% 
Income from 
operations 15,468 13,066 2,402 18.38% 
Net interest 
expense 87 64 23 35.94% 
Income before 
taxes 15,555 13,130 2,425 18.47% 
Provision for 
income tax (7,196) (6,158) (1,038) 16.86% 
Net Income 8,359 6,972 1,387 19.89% 
                                                 
21 Information adapted from CH Robinson Worldwide Inc. website and Financial Statements. 
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Continental Transport, Inc. 
Balance Sheet 
FYE 12/31/05, 12/31/04 
(unaudited) 
(In thousands) 12/31/2004 12/31/2003 % Change 12/31/2004 12/31/2003 % Change 
        
Current Assets 91,393 85,333 7.10% Current Liabilities 35,850 31,468 13.93% 
        
Property, Plant and 
Equipment    
    
        
Land 15,000 15,000 0%     
Buildings 26,000 26,000 0%     
Vehicles 52,844 29,749 77.63% Total Long-term Liabilities 57,580 43,542 32.24% 
(Less accumulated 
depreciation) 
 
(46,719) (44,273) 5.52% 
Stockholders’ Equity 
   
 Net Property, Plant and 
Equipment 47,125 26,476 77.99% 
Common Stock 8,400 8,400 0% 
Goodwill, net of 
accumulated amortization 15,297 15,297 0% 
Additional Paid in Capital 9,668 9,668 0% 
Other Assets 550 480 14.58% Retained Earnings 42,867 34,508 24.22% 
     Total Stockholders’ Equity 60,935 52,576 15.9% 
Total Assets
154,365 127,586 20.99% 
Total Liabilities and Stockholders’
Equity 154,365 127,586 20.99% 
 
 
 
 
 
DecisionSERVE Report 
Possible Explanations for Unexpected Increases in Repair and Maintenance 
Client: Continental Transport, FYE 2005 
  
  
Reason 
Information 
Source 
Related 
Accounts 
  
Expected 
Direction 
Increase in volume Income Statement Sales Increase 
Increase in labor rates Income Statement Salary Increase 
Repair rather than replace fixed 
assets Balance Sheet PP&E 
Either No 
Change or 
Decrease 
Fictitious Payments/Billings Evidence may be found through additional substantive testing. 
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